The proposition for Bangladesh and ASEAN to move closer together in partnership, and unity, seems to have stalled. While both sides are eager for Dhaka to join the grouping, ASEAN should be wary of importing new challenges, especially given its inability to address ongoing regional hostilities. 

The protest that unfolded in Bangladesh in August 2024, followed by the overthrow of the government, has put the region back into the spotlight. The international consequences of these occurrences, particularly the change in government, are considered critical within the region regarding stability. At least in Southeast Asia, Bangladesh’s declaration of its intent to join ASEAN has prompted a significant inquiry into ASEAN’s potential response, the strategic policies the organisation might implement, and the broader implications for its future role and cohesion in light of these developments.

ASEAN’s dilemma

Over the years, ASEAN has adapted its neutrality policy to the new era of great power competition and has endeavoured to turn inwards rather than face increasing geostrategic competition—although to its own detriment. Particularly since 2012, China’s strategic policymaking, notably the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as its expanding regional power has been counterbalanced by measures in the US and elsewhere with such concepts as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. ASEAN has attempted to avoid escalating competition between the US and China, while also seeking to benefit from their economic projects and bilateral trade. To navigate these complex relations, the group has aligned more closely with the concept of ASEAN centrality, both as a way to advance regional interests in Southeast Asian economics and to strengthen ASEAN’s political agency in regional decision-making. Through this strategic concept, it was believed that ASEAN could shift Southeast Asian countries from being the objects of direct and indirect “pivots” by the Great Powers to taking the “driver’s seat” in shaping the region’s political-security and economic architecture.

A further implication is that ASEAN countries have their own strategic objectives. While they generally support ASEAN’s collective ideas, they maintain historical ties, goals, and strategic partnerships with the dominant powers. While countries like the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia generally prefer to maintain the status quo, especially regarding security relations with the US, the economic dependence of countries such as Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos on China has increased China’s influence within the organisation.

Bangladesh’s potential accession to ASEAN would further complicate these divergent interests. Bangladesh faces several challenges, including the Kashmir issue, migration problems, and an economic crisis, while also being located in a region that the great powers seek to influence.

Losing Agency

Individual member states sometimes face issues that extend beyond ASEAN and can evolve to become global problems. The 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar emerged as a serious test for ASEAN. The issue presented conflicting pressures—upholding its long-standing values, addressing international public opinion, and dealing with the implications of the great power struggle—that it appeared unable to adjudicate. Its five-point consensus, calling for peaceful negotiations between “all concerned parties” and allowing an ASEAN special envoy access to the country, failed to resolve the issue. Meanwhile, Cambodia’s former prime minister, Hun Sen, poured cold water on efforts when, in bypassing the group, he travelled to Naypyidaw to meet directly with junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. Thailand also chose to bypass ASEAN by engaging directly with the regime. Both separate approaches also failed.

Bangladesh’s troubles

The recent revolution in Bangladesh has led to many significant internal and external developments. Even before Sheikh Hasina was forced to flee the country geopolitical challenges were emerging. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, with the aim of intensifying efforts to resolve their longstanding border disputes. This raised the question of whether the events in Bangladesh were geopolitically motivated, and whether there were larger designs among the powers for political influence.

These ongoing developments for Bangladesh may also become a concern for ASEAN in the near future. The chief adviser to Bangladesh’s interim government, Muhammad Yunus, has sought Malaysia’s support for the country’s bid to join ASEAN. “Bangladesh can be a bridge between ASEAN and SAARC,” said the Chief Adviser. However, with the Myanmar issue still ongoing, it would seem foolhardy to import additional problems with domestic, regional, and global implications—as the Bangladeshi inclusion would seem.

At this point, ASEAN could enhance the role of its existing bodies to address Bangladesh’s request to join ASEAN without extending membership to Bangladesh. Dhaka already engages with ASEAN through other platforms like BIMSTEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and could, via these fora, focus on these multilateral relationships rather than full membership.

ASEAN centrality adopts an approach of cooperation where development and prosperity are seen as unifying elements. To achieve this goal, ASEAN should continue to focus on exporting solutions rather than becoming an organisation that imports crises. For this reason, international forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3), and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) can be used for multifaceted and inclusive dialogue efforts for regional crises.

Mustafa Cem Koyuncu is Co-Founder of Bridge Turkey.

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