At the end of the Cold War, Europe could assume that the threat of a conventional war with Russia was remote. The USSR had collapsed and US military dominance would provide a security umbrella. Putin’s three-day Special Military Operations set loose epochal change. Geopolitics returned. Collective defence drives policy at a time when the US pivot toward China deprives Ukraine of crucial military assistance.
The absence of US aid was the final wake-up call to Europe that now faces the greatest land war since WWII. NATO’s eastern states, once junior members, are now the bulwark. Poland and its Baltic, Scandinavian, and Romanian allies are the first responders in the case of further Russian aggression.
The new reality has concretized into a more united Europe. Once a justification for Putin’s aggression, NATO enlargement occurred. Paris and Berlin have committed sizable aid packages and even suggested that assistance could involve NATO troops operating inside Ukraine territory. Latvia, Sweden, and Finland have reintroduced conscription.
Poland, plans to build troop levels up to 300,000 by 2030. Seven countries are bidding to sell it submarines. And a Canadian / Norwegian joint venture is helping her develop its newly discovered oil reserves, which will further collapse Russia’s European energy market.
However, despite these developments, challenges remain. There are issues with force numbers, interoperability, and control and command structures. Intelligence gathering and sharing present a complex array of national security risks. Matters of intellectual property rights inhibit technology transfers. In addition to these concerns, burden sharing and diverging national interests create obstacles for consensus-building. Further, European-based defence contractors must scale production to align with national security needs. Without a pan-continent economy of scale, inefficiencies in research, weapon development, and problems of redundancy will plague the effort and add exorbitant costs.
There is also the knot of a simmering angst between France and Germany over spending priorities, industrial strategy, and procurement autonomy. Poland, NATO’s third-largest military, is demanding a stronger say in the evolving machtpolitik as well.
Positive changes in defence planning, operational design, force structure, resourcing, and defence production occur. But gaps in electronic warfare and air defence remain. The breathtaking losses suffered by Russia on the battlefield have been partly offset by enhancements to Shahed and ballistic missile systems. These developments and his meagre territorial gains (less than 2,000 square miles this year) have Putin believing he can still outlast the West.
Interplay between rearmament and economic policy is complex.
Collective defence in a globalised economy is tightly interwoven with markets. More than ever, national economies and defence-industrial complexes are organically linked. Contemporary economic activity is an elaborate matrix of production-sharing arrangements. The interconnection of markets has driven the explosion of cross-border trade and a reordering of comparative advantages.
Synchronously, the worldwide redistribution of production has resulted in a deindustrialisation of the economies of the US and its allies. The global division of labour has transformed the great industrial powers into mostly service economies.
For the allies, the erosion of the industrial base raises questions about the West’s ability to rearm. The loss of steel mills, auto plants and electronics production creates deficiencies in entire competencies that cannot be quickly restored. Nonetheless, these same deficits generate investment options for private capital and public-private partnerships.
Non-defence areas of need include infrastructure upgrade, the development of nuclear energy, and LNG provisioning to compensate for the loss of Russian energy supplies. According to a McKinsey report, private capital investment in Europe is lacking by at least €100 billion more every year; primarily in such strategic industries as energy, AI, defence, aerospace, quantum and life sciences.
While Washington turns its focus on the threat arising from the Pacific Rim, China’s Belt and Rode Initiative eyes Europe. The PRC exported over $560 billion worth of goods to Europe in 2024, compared to $115 billion to Russia. It holds leases on the Gdynia Container Port and has publicly announced its willingness to contribute to the reconstruction effort in post-war Ukraine. In spite of its well-publicised “no limits” partnership, Beijing must grudgingly realise its future lies more with Brussels and Washington than it does with Moscow.
US national interests have always involved Europe and the need for American technology and investment is no less urgent than during the height of the Cold War, and just as vital to American security. NATO’s central tenet in 1949 was a belief in cooperation between allies. The Washington Treaty, as NATO was also known, made possible an era of relative peace through an integrated system of common defence bound by commerce, trade, and shared values.
The old fears have returned thanks to Russia’s illegal war. Thankfully, the values and sense of purpose remain. America’s strategic partnership with Europe continues – politically and economically. If not, looming ahead is a period of threats and menacing challenges.
Maj. General Krzysztof Nolbert is the Defense, Military, Naval and Air Attaché at the Polish Embassy in Washington. He has held various leadership positions, including roles in NATO operations and as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operational Affairs at the Operational Command of the Armed Forces of Poland. He served in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and holds a graduate degree in Defense Policy from the U.S. Army War College.
Dr Jack Jarmon served as USAID Technical Advisor for the Russian government during the mid 1990s. He has taught international relations at the University of Pennsylvania and Rutgers University where he was Associate Director and Research Professor at the Command Control and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis. He is currently editorial board member and contributor at PostPravda.info, a Ukrainian and Polish news organization.
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