We’ve become so fixated on the narrative of escalating rivalry—with the US on one side and China and Russia on the other—that we often overlook a subtler yet crucial reality: the potential for strategic alignment between these great powers. Beyond outright competition, an underappreciated space for tacit great-power coordination exists as they navigate and expand their spheres of influence.

Donald Trump’s interest in acquiring Greenland from Denmark—a sovereign nation and NATO ally—along with his claim that Canada should become a US state might initially seem like yet another impulsive whim. However, when viewed in the context of US strategic competition with China and Russia, this move seems less like a fleeting idea and more like a calculated maneuver in the high-stakes game of great power geopolitics. By pursuing Greenland, Trump positioned the US alongside Russia and China in the race to expand influence and assert dominance on the world stage.

For Trump, losing influence to Russia and China would represent an unacceptable defeat. However, direct confrontation carries immense risks and costs. Instead, he may believe that the key to preserving America’s global standing lies in adopting similar strategies to those of other great powers—solidifying spheres of influence.

As of late 2024, the US has allocated nearly $183 billion in aid to Ukraine, yet Russia still occupies 20 percent of Ukrainian territory. Trump says that it is too costly for the US to continue funding the war indefinitely and has urged Russia and Ukraine to return to the negotiating table. To date, although Vladimir Putin has expressed a willingness to meet with Trump, he maintains that any truce would depend on Ukraine accepting the current territorial status quo.

Indeed, Russia lags significantly behind the US and China both economically and militarily, and this material power gap is only expected to widen over time. However, great power is ultimately defined by a state’s ability to compel other nations to respond to its actions, often through force or coercion. Historically, the Soviet Union during the Cold War was frequently described as a “lopsided great power”—a state that, despite economic limitations, maintained its global influence through military strength, strategic discipline, and expansive size.

This phenomenon is not without precedent; Australia in the early 20th century and Japan in the 1930s similarly leveraged military power and strategic positioning to compensate for economic constraints. Despite its military underperformance in Ukraine, Russia’s war sends a clear message—particularly to Europe: “I can make you extremely uncomfortable.”

Meanwhile, China’s prolonged efforts to assert control over Taiwan have intensified under Xi Jinping’s leadership. Determined to cement his legacy, Xi has made reunification a central pillar of his presidency, asserting that “China must be unified and will certainly be unified.” For Trump, the pressing question remains: Will the US truly commit to defending Taiwan, even at the risk of a catastrophic conflict?

The reality that the US must compete with China and Russia, but cannot directly confront them, creates a precarious scenario: a potential tacit understanding among three ambitious leaders: Trump, Putin, and Xi. Could they strike an unspoken deal, allowing each to pursue their ambitions without interference? Imagine a world where Russia dominates Ukraine, China asserts control over Taiwan, and the US holds sway over Greenland—de facto if not de jure—all under a tacit agreement to respect each other’s spheres of influence.

These behind-the-scenes power maneuvers do more than evoke the age-old concept of spheres of influence—they hint at a quiet, backroom arrangement among global titans, a geopolitical version of Let’s Make a Deal. Imagine Trump, Putin, and Xi engaged in a high-stakes poker game, casually exchanging chips labelled Ukraine, Taiwan, and Greenland, each calculating their next move to solidify dominance in an increasingly volatile world. A historical parallel is Winston Churchill’s letter to Josef Stalin, in which he proposed the division of influence in the Balkans, demonstrating how great powers have historically shaped—and could continue to do so—geopolitics through great power coordination rather than direct confrontation.

But what would such speculated great power coordination mean for the rest of the world? A pessimistic viewpoint outlines a resurgence of realpolitik, where international relations are dictated by the cold, unforgiving reality that “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” This kind of coordination resembles the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939—a temporary arrangement of convenience crafted to buy time and secure short-term strategic gains while concealing deeper, more antagonistic ambitions.

This type of great power coordination, driven more by necessity than trust, could push the world into a dangerous state of uncertainty, where smaller nations are reduced to bargaining chips in the grand chessboard of global politics. The risk of escalating tensions and unforeseen consequences would be significant as rival blocs emerge in response, potentially igniting new conflicts that could spiral out of control.

On the other hand, a more optimistic scenario is also possible. This alignment of interests could potentially stabilise the international order. By recognising each other’s spheres of influence, the three great powers might unintentionally establish a framework for a new balance of power.

Yes, such an arrangement would likely trigger significant opposition both domestically and from the international community. In particular, other democracies and advocates of international norms would likely express strong disapproval, potentially refusing to cooperate or actively countering actions they deem illegitimate or unjustified.

However, even the slightest possibility of such great power coordination carries immense significance. Together, China and the US account for over half of the global economy and wield unmatched military strength. China is the largest trading partner for more than 120 nations, while the US serves as the principal military ally for much of the developed world. Meanwhile, despite its material decline and the setbacks of its poorly executed war in Ukraine, Russia continues to wield significant influence across the vast Eurasian region and remains a key player in global affairs. This stark concentration of global power enables these nations to reshape, and, at times, disregard established international norms, to advance their strategic interests at the expense of lesser powers.

We may have become so accustomed to viewing the world as a stage of escalating rivalry between the US on one side and China and Russia on the other that we often overlook or dismiss the potential for coordination among them.

Yet, such coordination cannot be entirely ruled out, particularly as the US grapples with significant challenges to its domestic and international legitimacy. Despite its foundational role in shaping the post-World War II international order, the US faces increasing scepticism, even from its closest allies. For many nations, concerns about hypocrisy in US foreign policy and growing domestic polarisation have been further heightened by Trump’s second term.

Of course, this does not suggest that these three powers are likely to form genuine solidarity against the rest of the world, given their deep and enduring differences. However, could such great power coordination develop into something significant, or is this merely an overblown concern doomed to collapse under the weight of its contradictions? These questions remain open.

Dr Minran Liu is a Lecturer at the School of Political Science and International Studies (POLSIS) at the University of Queensland. His teaching and research centre on Asia-Pacific security, Chinese foreign and security policy and Australia-China relations.

Dr Ye Xue is a research fellow at The China Institute University of Alberta and a non-resident fellow at the Chinese Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. His research focuses on international relations and Chinese foreign policy.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.