As an upper riparian state to both Pakistan and Bangladesh, India is in a dominant position. However, the upper riparian position has added strain to the two lower riparian countries. The main reason for the tensions is the deterioration of political ties.
India and Pakistan are in a near-zero engagement posture, and any constructive interaction between them is unlikely in the coming days. On the other hand, since Hasina’s exit from Bangladesh, political ties between Dhaka and New Delhi have nosedived. Nevertheless, the two states have not stopped interacting, as can be seen in the recent meeting between the Indian High Commissioner to Dhaka, Pranay Verma, and BNP head Tarique Rahman in January 2026. Also, Jamaat chief Shafiqur Rahman revealed that an Indian diplomat met him in December 2025.
Some of the religious organisations and seers strongly reacted to the killing and violence against Hindus in Bangladesh. Indeed, it was this pressure from these organisations that led the Kolkata Knight Riders, a cricket team that competes in the Indian Premier League (IPL), to release the Bangladeshi fast bowler Mustafizur Rahman, whom it had bought for INR 9.2 crore to play in this year’s edition of the IPL. The release of Rahman has not been well-received in Bangladesh. The political tensions between Dhaka and New Delhi over the fast bowler’s release led Bangladesh to withdraw from the T20 Cricket World Cup 2026, jointly hosted by India and Sri Lanka.
The future of any water agreement/treaty largely depends on the Indian state’s behaviour and its foreign policy decisions. Unlike upper riparian countries, the lower riparian countries require water-sharing arrangements to protect their interests. In the past, India remained a party to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, despite military confrontations and political tensions with Pakistan. However, New Delhi began to change its mood after Narendra Modi led the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in 2014. After the 2016 and 2019 militant attacks in Jammu and Kashmir, water sharing became the primary response to tensions with Pakistan. In 2025, after the Pahalgam terror attack, India unilaterally held the IWT in abeyance. In the months since April 2025, New Delhi has cleared and fast-tracked works on projects such as Pakul Dul and Kiru. India refused to attend a meeting of a Neutral Expert selected by the World Bank to address the India-Pakistan water issue. Earlier, when questions about its legality before the CoA were raised, New Delhi did not participate in its proceedings. Soon after the IWT was put on hold in April 2025, Pakistan stated that any attempt to divert or stop the flow of water in the country would be considered an “act of war”. Some members of the Pakistan Army and civilian leadership have also publicly stated that they will not hesitate to go to a full-fledged war over the water issue.
Like the IWT, the Ganga/ Ganges Water Treaty (GWT) has also worked despite some uneasiness over water ties between the two countries. The GWT was signed in 1996 and is going to expire in December this year. India and Bangladesh have agreed to renew the GWT. The two sides also began taking measurements at the selected points near the Farakka and Hardinge Bridge. However, two concerns surround the GWT. First, if India and Bangladesh reach a renewed agreement/treaty, it remains uncertain how domestic political groups in India might respond. Given the political situation in Bangladesh, the BNP and the Islamist parties are likely to emerge as the leading political actors after the February elections. Will those groups support the Indian government, or pressurise it not to proceed, as they did in the case of Mustafizur Rahman? Second, how will the Union government of India respond to West Bengal’s position on the GWT renewal? Earlier, invoking “cooperative federalism”, the BJP government decided not to proceed with an interim deal on the Teesta River.
India’s riparian activities and decisions are reflected in its policy towards neighbouring countries. Given the current state of political ties, it is less likely that India and Pakistan will engage in dialogue on the IWT, at least in the near future. For Bangladesh, reaching an agreement to renew the GWT may not be difficult; however, the greater challenge could lie in ensuring effective implementation. Second, any popular support for establishing “absolute sovereignty” over shared water resources, as advocated by the “discredited” Harmon Doctrine, runs against the current international norms and principles on transboundary water ties. Notably, India has always supported international norms. Third, India’s decision regarding its South Asian lower-riparian neighbours may shape Chinese thinking on the rivers flowing from Tibet into India. Finally, amid climate change and a widening demand-supply gap, there is a need for cooperation over shared water resources. River Basin planning and management offer viable options; however, they require mutual trust and political collaboration among basin-sharing countries.
Amit Ranjan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore.
Nabeela Siddiqui is an Assistant Professor at the Vinayaka Mission’s Law School, VMRF-DU, Chennai.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
