On Tuesday 27 May, the Australian Institute of International Affairs welcomed the Hon. Bob Carr, previous Australian foreign minister and NSW premier, for an address on “the New America”, looking back at the first six months of the second Trump presidency. A self-professed American political history “obsessive”, Mr Carr opened his talk with a turn through his personal library, from Carl Sandburg’s multi-volume biography of Abraham Lincoln to six volumes of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s speeches as governor of New York. Mr Carr sees such works as a window into America’s evolution—all of which, Mr Carr argued, is devalued under Trump.
Mr Carr began his reflections on populist movements in American history, searching for a historical precedent to Trump’s extraordinary takeover of the US political system. Back in 1928, Louisiana Senator Huey “The Kingfish” Long had shared many of Trump’s abrasive, populist ideas but had failed in subverting a stubborn two-party system. Before then only William Jennings Bryan, Democratic presidential nominee in 1896, 1900 and 1908, had achieved a similar feat to Trump’s by taking over a major party from within. Trump—“a Bonapartian figure in American politics”—and the MAGA movement had achieved the impossible: not to create a third party but to take the Republicans in new directions.
While history might conjure near-likenesses, Trump 2.0 as seen by Mr Carr is a brutal education in how quickly things can change. The New America is marked by three key developments: the complete overnight collapse of ethical standards, the strong fascistic echoes within the regime, and America’s new character as a rogue state, demonstrated most clearly in Trump’s “moronic fetish” of tariffs, a fetish which threatens to bring about a world recession.
Mr Carr reminded the audience that Trump has claimed that his “proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and a unifier”. Part of Trump’s appeal is his critique of “forever wars” that have ended in disaster (notably in Afghanistan) or indeed never ended at all. Military intervention, the gloved fist of American foreign policy, is being turned on its head by a president who walks away from alliance commitments and embraces a world in which America’s priority is to bargain with Russia and China. He had “turned the knob down” on Taiwan.
While not yet constituting a new American foreign policy doctrine, Mr Carr questioned where this notion comes from. “Who was kicking it around in think tank land?” he asked. “Does it override other currents in American foreign policy?” The answers will be influenced by fractures emerging within the MAGA movement and by the two forces most likely to restrain Trump: markets and the mid-term elections. This new America does not seek American primacy in upholding liberal international norms. As Trump walks away from alliance commitments, America’s standing as the primus inter pares of the international system buckles.
How should Australia navigate this new America? The Australian Government has resisted over-reacting to the (relatively modest) 10% tariffs to be imposed on Australia, focusing on avoiding compromise to our biosecurity laws and damage to our Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme—areas that are uniquely Australian in character. Australia will continue to rely on America for its security. This should not preclude seeking independence within the ANZUS alliance, the QUAD and the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangement.
Mr Carr concluded his address with an appeal for Australia to foster forward diplomacy in our region and the world.
- The Shanghai Communiqué of 1972—the long-standing basis for avoiding US or Australian conflict with China over the status of Taiwan—had been an example of diplomacy at its best: “mobilising words to avoid war”.
- The Trump administration seemed to have returned to this approach, avoiding provocative actions over Taiwan of the kind undertaken by the Biden administration.
- In trade, Australia as a responsible and trusted middle power should be a builder of a rules-based treaty system, as we have demonstrated in our recent trade agreement with India and the growing prospect of finalising a trade agreement with the European Union.
- The US needed to accept the fundamental importance to Australia’s economy of trade with China, which would be imperilled by war. The B52s based in the Northern Territory by the US needed to be phased out: they are a nuclear target. AUKUS needed to be revised to take account of the increasing unlikelihood of US nuclear-powered submarines becoming available to Australia.
Mr Carr recommended the approach taken by Sam Roggeveen in his book “The Echidna Strategy”, advocating that Australia must be bold enough to carve its own place in this new and unpredictable world.
In response to audience questions and comments, Mr Carr predicted that not much would change if Trump were to disappear from the scene. His likely successors were committed to MAGA, which was now the major force in American politics; the Democrats were in complete disarray. Trump and his supporters dominated Congress and would not be swayed by adverse Supreme Court findings.
Asked about Ukraine, he said Trump was likely to continue to pursue a ceasefire involving some recognition of Russian gains.
Pressed on AUKUS, he predicted that American nuclear-powered submarines would be based in Australian ports in as little as two years. French conventionally-powered submarines were not a realistic alternative, and the UK was unlikely to provide submarines for Australia under AUKUS in a realistic timeframe. The presence in Australia of US submarines risked making us a nuclear target, though not as unequivocally as the US B52s in Darwin aimed unmistakably at attacking China.
Mr Carr agreed with—and deplored—the evidence that the Trump administration is determined to undermine secular education, a long-standing objective of his religious supporters.
Asked about the Gaza situation, he compared Israel’s behaviour to the Nazi crimes against Jews in the Warsaw ghetto. He called for Labor’s policy platform in favour of recognizing the Palestinian state to be implemented.
He acknowledged the continuity of US policy under Trump with the policies of early presidents McKinley and Monroe, with their emphasis on the US pursuing its interests as a great power in its own right. Trump might lead the US out of such bodies as the IMF—but not the UN: he valued the power given to the US by its veto right in the UN Security Council.
Report by Anton Peden, AIIA NSW intern
