On 4 November 2025, the Australian Institute of International Affairs NSW welcomed Dr Alexey Muraviev, Associate Professor of National Security and Strategic Studies at Curtin University, to address the undersea warfare capabilities of Russia in the Pacific.
Muraviev began by stating that Australia and other regional players underestimate the presence and capabilities of Russia in the Pacific theatre. While there is strong scrutiny of Chinese naval operations, they do not apply the same level of scrutiny to Russian activities.
He laid out a history of the Russian navy, noting that in its birth phase, from 1904 to1916, Russia realised that submarines could be used as an effective deterrent. From then, Russian naval engagements grew to peak in the Cold War, with many undersea operations. But the fall of the Soviet Union saw a rapid decommissioning of Russia’s boats and a general decline of its navy from 1989 to 2012. Muraviev said this created a lingering presumption that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian naval vessels lay decommissioned and unutilised.
In fact, however, the Russian navy is in its ‘reanimation’ stage and its current military capabilities are profound. Russia has commissioned new boats, and President Putin has confirmed that Russia has completed successful tests of its Poseidon Strategic System, which comprises the world’s largest nuclear submarines carrying mega-tonnage warheads. When launched, these warheads can destroy coastal infrastructure, cause tsunamis, and have other strategic impacts. Two of the four submarines within the Poseidon Strategic System have been allocated to the Pacific.
He suggested that our assessments of security threats need to be benchmarked on quality, rather than quantity alone. Russia’s submarine fleet might be smaller than those of other countries, but it is more lethal. Russia (unlike China) has more experience with submarines and with fighting wars. In the Ukraine war, its submarines are deterring American and NATO forces from intervening.
Russia’s production of naval assets has remained unaffected by the costs of its Ukraine invasion. It is upgrading its capabilities, building six new types of submarines, five of which are designed for its Pacific fleet. Russian investment into its navy is also reflected in the strength of its naval bases. Despite being almost at the epicentre of a recent earthquake-triggered tsunami, Russia’s Rybachiy sub-base for its Pacific fleet only sustained damage to one of its replaceable piers.
Muraviev identified naval operations Russia is conducting with countries such as India, Myanmar, and Iran. Despite lacking a formal joint defence treaty, Russia and China have conducted joint submarine patrols. Especially given Russia’s cognisance of AUKUS, Muraviev said Australia needed to be watchful of Russia’s naval presence in the Pacific.
Questions from the audience first sought to contextualise the strength of naval relationships Russia has with other countries: India, for example, is building defence ties with Japan and the United States, suggesting a diversification of partnerships and divergence from Russia.
Muraviev responded that in the naval sphere, India is aligned with Russia. He argued that, although Indian diplomats might be oriented towards the West, Indian defence officials were still doing business with Russia. Russia is offering cooperation to India ahead of other countries, and Indian submarines are inspired by Russian designs, which suggests longevity in Russo-Indian cooperation. This is because naval platforms are designed to operate for upwards of twenty years. India switching from Russian systems would require – inefficiently – that crews and engineers be trained for new platforms, and that tactics and logistics be redeveloped. Secondly, Muraviev noted that India and Russia both have long historical memories. Russia and India have cooperated in the past, while American forces in Task Force 74 have (in India’s view) ‘harassed’ India in the Bay of Bengal.
An audience member then sought insight on the development of autonomous nuclear submarines. Muraviev responded that Soviet submarines had minimal crew support. However, to be fully autonomous without any human involvement, it seemed that only drones or submersibles could currently operate autonomously. He acknowledged that Russia claims it had full autonomous control of a drone that descended 10,000 feet into the Mariana Trench. Given the technology for some autonomous control of undersea vessels, he asked whether nuclear submarines, autonomously run, will face the same hurdle: ‘Who is going to press the button? Is it the algorithm?’
Asked how underwater drones can be controlled if radio signals do not transmit under water, Muraviev agreed that there could be some communication issues. But there are work-arounds, such as pre-programming the drone to follow certain courses, using wireless signals, and physically wiring the drone differently to ensure control. The bigger concern is whether the signal to control the drone can be compromised, and the interplay between drone and mothership disrupted.
An audience member asked whether the Russian navy can operate as one combined power, or whether it must operate in modular units given that Russia is circled by four seas, that it had lost control of naval bases in Syria, and that the Vietnam base is now only offering technical assistance. Muraviev responded that, despite its navy being geographically sequestered, Russia still had wide naval coverage of the waters. Russian missiles have the same range as tomahawk missiles. He noted however that each of the Russian naval units did need to be capable of fighting independently of other naval units.
The discussion left the audience more informed about Russia’s expanding naval capabilities and more aware of the implications of those capabilities for security in the Pacific.
Report by Aman Mohamed. AIIA NSW intern
Alexey Muraviev centre, AIIA NSW presidentIan Lincoln left and intern Aman Mohamed right
