European naval deployments to the Indo-Pacific – distant bystander or protagonist?

On Thursday 6 November 2025 Associate Professor Axel Berkofsky of the University of Padua in Italy, during a visit to Australia, addressed the Institute on the increasing presence of European naval vessels in the Indo-Pacific.

Berkofsky focussed on the substantial and growing roles in the Indo-Pacific of France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy – all prompted by growing Chinese military installations, including its network of heavily-armed, nuclear-capable artificial islands and the consequent threats to maritime passage in the South China Sea/Taiwan Strait. France in particular had deployed substantial new naval capacities; Germany had sought to appear less confrontational toward China.

In an article in the Institute’s national weekly Australian Outlook Berkofsky has enlarged on the strategic thinking behind west European naval policy in the Indo-Pacific, with a strong emphasis on perceived threats to western interests arising from Chinese expansionism in the region. He notes that Italy has justified expanding its long-standing European strategic focus by describing the Indo-Pacific as part of a “larger Mediterranean”.

Questions and discussion following Berkofsky’s address focussed on the extent of western European interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Berkofsky emphasised trade ties and economic interests, including access to Japan; he agreed that China did not represent a military threat to Europe. European naval involvement in the region was enhancing intra-European defence ties, prompted by the concerns raised by the Ukraine war. He acknowledged the dilemma faced by European countries in balancing involvement in the Indo-Pacific against the more immediate concerns about Russia.

Asked about Vietnam’s place in regional strategy, Berkofsky discussed Vietnam’s complex role. China and Vietnam have a long history of close relations but also of divergences and conflict. Like China, Vietnam has occupied disputed islands in the South China Sea and installed military facilities, contrary to international law. At the same time, Vietnam is seeking closer defence ties with both France and the US. Vietnam and the US engage in military cooperation, particularly in maritime security and counter-terrorism; this involves joint exercises, training programs, and the provision of military equipment.

Berkofsky commented on the German dilemma, faced with Chinese complaints that European actions in the South China Sea amount to interference in Chinese domestic policies. Germany accounts for 40 per cent of Europe’s export to China: good relations are fundamental to both countries’ economic interests. There are tensions within the German armed forces about the balance of resources being allocated to the navy and the army, with the more pressing challenges to German security coming from the Ukraine situation. Germany’s first naval deployment to the Indo-Pacific in 2021 had been little more than notional, but its 2024 deployment had been more substantial. France’s deployments were much more important, comparable to those of the UK and further bolstered by the presence of French bases in its Pacific territories.

Asked about European double standards in combatting China’s regional activities while accepting US interventions in its neighbourhood, for example in the current case of Venezuela, Berkofsky responded that Europe’s approach remained cautious. It was no longer a mere bystander in the Indo-Pacific, but nor was it a protagonist: its role was to enhance intra-European solidarity and western interests at a time of international uncertainty.

Axel Berkofsky 2025

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