NASA (2014)

Since 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Party fled to Taiwan after being defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Civil War, the status of the island has been the source of constant political tension and potential military conflict between the Republic of China (ROC), or Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), or China. Full independence has traditionally been the overarching goal for Taiwan, whereas ‘peaceful reunification’ of the two sides of the Taiwan Straits is China’s ultimate objective. Both entities claim sovereignty over all of ‘China’ however, resulting in a political stalemate that has lasted for over sixty years. Another important actor is the United States, which has played a key role throughout the historical dispute by first supporting the ROC during most of the Cold War, before normalising relations with the PRC in 1972 and severing official ties with Taiwan in 1979. At the same time, the US has maintained the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which allows for the “supply of defensive weapons” and the continuation of a “US capability in the region to help Taiwan,” leading many to argue that the US is Taiwan’s “only major source of political and military support.” In this context, scholars have long debated the likelihood of political tensions spilling over into outright military conflict involving China, Taiwan and potentially the US, with some seeing war over Taiwan as unlikely, while others arguing that confrontation is inevitable. This essay argues that Taiwan will always be a potential source of conflict (defined here in military terms) in the Asia-Pacific region as long as pro-independence desires exist, and as long as the US continues to sell weapons to Taiwan. Furthermore, the likelihood of conflict erupting over these two conditions is exacerbated by China’s aggressive military stance in the Taiwan Straits, and its general rise in military power. However, there are a number of factors preventing conflict from breaking out in the short-term. These include increased economic interdependence between China and Taiwan, improved diplomatic relations as a result of growing official and unofficial exchanges and cooperation, the gradual decline in US political support for Taiwan and Taiwan’s constrained and increasingly isolated international position.

Pro-independence currents in Taiwan

Taiwan remains a potential source of military conflict in the region because of the existence of pro-independence currents in the country and the China’s longstanding commitment to use force in response to any ‘renegade’ moves towards independence. One the one hand, the KMT, who have been been in power since 2008, have led commentators to consider a substantial warming of China-Taiwan relations. However, pro-independence sentiment remains the cornerstone of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), seen in their provocative moves towards independence since the party’s founding in 1986. Two notable examples in recent history illustrate this. In 1999, DPP President Lee Teng-hui caused a significant stir when, in a public interview, he openly characterised relations between Taiwan and China as “special state-to-state relations,” implying that Taiwan was an independent, sovereign state. Lee’s DPP successor, Chen Shui-bian, also made a series of public appeals to “Taiwan nationalism and autonomy from China”, provoking a negative reaction from Chinese leaders.

These sentiments have the potential to escalate into conflict between Taiwan and China. As Lim asserts if independence was actively pursued by Taiwan then this would certainly “result in a war between the two”, for according to the Chinese 2004 Defence White Paper, “[s]hould the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of ‘Taiwan independence’, the Chinese people and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost.” While the KMT have won two elections in a row, the idea of a DPP victory in the 2016 elections is not a farfetched notion given that in 2012 the DPP managed to attract over 45 per cent of the vote in the presidential election, and over 35 per cent in the legislative election. Thus, as long as the prospect of a Taiwanese move towards independence exists, most likely in the form of the DPP, Taiwan will remain a potential source of conflict. China would be forced to act militarily if independence was articulated in any way or else risk an erosion of its political legitimacy.

US arms sales to Taiwan

Additionally, Taiwan continues to be a source of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region because the continuing sale of US weapons to Taiwan risks provoking China into a military confrontation with Taiwan. Although logic would hold that greater improvements to Taiwan’s weapons and defence capabilities might stabilise relations with China, the US’ continued arms sales to Taiwan have had the opposite effect in Beijing, with Chinese officials perceiving such action as a violation of China’s core interests. Indeed, Tucker and Glaser point out that China is highly critical of the US’ military sales to Taiwan, reflected in China’s reactions to the US’ $6.5 billion arms package sold to Taiwan in 2008, and another $6 billion package approved in 2010. In response to the former, China suspended military contacts with the US until mid-2009, while the latter package prompted public outrage and the cancellation of a planned security dialogue and other military exchanges with the US. One academic from Renmin University even suggested that China should “accelerate the development and testing of high-tech weaponry” to demonstrate China’s indignation. In light of these hostile responses it can be concluded that if the US continues to sell arms to Taiwan there is a possibility that China will take even stronger measures in the future such as an all-out retaliation against Taiwan. Even the US seems to be aware that a substantial provision of modern weapons systems to Taiwan would anger China and has gradually become reluctant to supply advanced weapons like F-16 Fighting Falcons in fear of provoking a military response from China. Despite the reluctance to provide arms or military to Taiwan, any form of aid by the US has the potential to lead to conflict in the Taiwan Straits.

China’s military rise

Furthermore, the likelihood that conflict over Taiwan will occur is exacerbated by China’s growing military build-up in the Taiwan Straits, not to mention China’s overall military rise and status as the world’s second-largest military spender. As of 2007, around 700-800 Chinese short-range ballistic missiles were “based in the coastal provinces along the Taiwan Strait,” and by 2010, this figure had increased to between 1,050 and 1,150. According to the Pentagon, these missiles are China’s “most potent weapon to deter Taiwan independence or compel reunification on Beijing’s terms,” and their positioning in the Strait, along with nuclear attack submarines and aircraft carriers, means that military conflict between China and Taiwan is no longer a distant possibility but an almost certain reality if China is seriously provoked. Annual military tests have also taken place near Dongshan Island, Fujian province, with Taiwan the “imagined target.” Again, this only “exacerbates security dilemma dynamics,” and increases the potential for conflict to break out between China and Taiwan, which may even involve the US if the TRA is invoked.

Moreover, China has increased its military budget to almost $132 billion this year, and many scholars believe that if the military capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continue to grow, then the “use of force to ‘resolve’ Taiwan’s status might look more appealing to Beijing.” Especially, considering the “deficiencies” in Taiwan’s defence systems, a result of the decline in Taiwan’s defence budget. In other words, conflict is likely to occur if China perceives its military advantage over Taiwan to be “large enough to achieve a quick and decisive victory at limited cost.” If China continues to maintain an aggressive military posture in the Taiwan Strait and if its military spending continues unabated this will further exacerbate the tensions surrounding pro-independence sentiments in Taiwan. In fact, this may lead to greater demands for US military support in China making conflict ever more likely.

Economic interdependence between China and Taiwan

While the above arguments demonstrate that Taiwan remains a potential source of conflict in the region in the future there are a number of mediating factors that could prevent conflict from breaking out in the short-term. The most prominent of these factors is the growing economic interdependence between China and Taiwan. According to liberal theorists, economic interdependence can “harmonise interests and reduce the risk of conflict,” and in the case of China and Taiwan, some argue that economic linkages may “eventually make possible a peaceful reunification.” Indeed, the value of two-way trade between China and Taiwan has increased markedly in the last decade. In 2004, total trade was estimated to be at US$6.6 billion, and by 2013 this figure had jumped to a record US$123 billion. By 2010, China had become Taiwan’s “largest export market”, with around 40 per cent of Taiwanese exports going to China. In a move that has been widely touted as having the potential to mitigate conflict and promote greater cross-strait relations, China and Taiwan also established a free trade agreement (FTA) in 2010. The Free Trade Agreement known as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) provides “privileged access” to Chinese markets, and involves the removal of tariffs off a wide range of products on both sides. Taiwanese investment has also been an “important source of capital” for China, made clear by the fact that Taiwanese businesses had invested an enormous US$200 billion into the Chinese economy by the beginning of 2014. Likewise, Sutter has noted the “growing Chinese investment and presence in Taiwan.” China and Taiwan also have what Clark terms “functionally linked economies”, whereby different stages of the production process for products occur in each country, such as advanced components being produced in Taiwan, before being exported to China for final assembly.

Although some scholars rightly note that the economic interdependence of China and Taiwan has not translated into “political reconciliation or reduced military readiness” on either side, deepening economic integration has at least contributed to “stability and the present ‘status quo’ equilibrium.” This has arguably made both Chinese and Taiwanese leaders think twice before compromising their “economic alliance.” In particular, given Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, its largest and most important trading partner, it is unlikely that Taiwan would do anything to jeopardise this relationship such as moving towards independence. As a result this has reduced the likelihood of conflict at present.

Thawing of China-Taiwan diplomatic ties

Since the election of President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT in 2008, there have been a number of positive developments in China-Taiwan diplomatic relations. The improvement of relations has been facilitated by official and unofficial exchanges and cooperative activities, all of which help to prevent the likelihood of Taiwan turning into a military hotspot in the near future. At an unofficial level, Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) have held dialogues since 1992 and in recent years these have yielded significant results in terms of the establishment of “direct transportation and cargo links, tourism, and food safety.” Earlier this year, SEF-ARATS also signed agreements on “meteorological exchanges and earthquake monitoring” to protect citizens on both sides of the Strait, and it has been said that the next round of talks will cover issues related to “trade in goods, taxes, cross-strait representative offices, cooperation on environmental protection and aviation safety.” The SEF Chairman, Lin Join-sane, stated that the SEF-ARATS talks have not only improved “cross-strait economic and social development”, but they have also “helped maintain regional stability,” demonstrating the value of cross-strait exchanges in preventing conflict. In addition, leaders of the CCP and KMT often hold informal dialogues which include exchanges taking place between “mayors and business associations” for the purposes of reaching “functional agreements.”

China and Taiwan also cooperated in natural resource exploration in the northern part of the South China Sea in December 2008 and interestingly, there has even been “tacit coordination” between the two sides in relation to claiming the islands and reefs within the “nine-dotted lines” of the South China Sea. This is because China and Taiwan’s legal claims are actually identical – both can agree that the islands and reefs belong to one or the other thereby enabling them to “treat each other as a natural ally vis-à-vis the other ASEAN claimants.” Thus, while territorial claims in the South China Sea are a source of conflict between China and the other Southeast Asian claimants, they actually enable cooperation between China and Taiwan. According to Hao, such exchanges and cooperative efforts have the potential to reconcile cultural and political differences, but only if they are maintained and strengthened over time. In the short-term it is likely that the current atmosphere of friendly and fruitful interactions across the Strait will ensure that conflict over Taiwan is kept in check, especially in light of the fact that KMT and CCP leaders have signalled their mutual desire to achieve a peace agreement. In the long-term however, this cannot be guaranteed, particularly if there is a change in government in Taiwan in 2016.

Waning US political support for Taiwan

The decline of US political support for Taiwan may prevent conflict in the short time by discouraging Taiwan from presently seeking independence, thus preventing any provocation of China. Although the US continues to supply Taiwan with arms, US political support for Taiwan or actual military intervention in the event of a Chinese attack cannot be guaranteed. Firstly, the US has always been in favour of a ‘one China policy’ and in 1998 the Clinton administration asserted that there would be “no US support for independence for Taiwan”, “no support for a two-China or ‘one China, one Taiwan’ policy”, and “no support Taiwan’s admittance into any international organisation that requires statehood for membership.” In the context of China’s continuing rise in power, the waning of congressional interest in Taiwan and Taiwan’s status as a “diplomatic liability,” there is little evidence to suggest that the US would risk exacerbating tensions with China by reversing this longstanding policy. Moreover, for the same reasons it is becoming increasingly unlikely that the US would consider “coming to Taiwan’s defence in a real crisis involving an attack or blockade by China.” In fact, despite the continuation of the TRA, there has arguably been “no ‘unambiguous’ American commitment to defend Taiwan” since 1980. According to Lewis and Xue, Taiwanese independence groups have “long depended on American political and military support to underwrite their pursuit.” In the absence of such backing Taiwan is unlikely to move towards independence now and risk aggravating China. Of course, US interests vis-à-vis Taiwan might shift if China becomes too aggressive and problematic for the US. However, for the moment, the lack of overt US political and military support for Taiwan means that Taiwan is not currently a source of immediate conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.

Taiwan’s international isolation

Finally, Taiwan’s international position is too constrained and isolated to risk making independence claims that could provoke or aggravate China into a conflict. Taiwan is currently in no position to make demands on China, as it is highly dependent on China not only economically but also diplomatically. For instance, Taiwan was admitted into the World Health Assembly (WHA) “only after China dropped its objections,” demonstrating that Taiwan only has a voice in world affairs if China allows it to. This argument seems to align with Chien-Min Chao’s theory of integration, which posits that “as mainland China grows in power, nations and sub-national regions in the continental vicinity will be sucked into its orbit and become satellites.”

In addition, following Sino-US rapprochement and the full normalisation of diplomatic ties in 1979, more and more countries began to switch their recognition of Taiwan to China. Taiwan has thus experienced “international political isolation as a result of pressure from China.” Currently, only 22 countries still recognise Taiwan politically, as according to Tan, hardly any country is prepared to “anger China and jeopardise political and economic relations with it on account of Taiwan.” In light of this constrained position vis-à-vis China and the international community, Taiwan must practise “reassurance, diplomacy, and persuasion” as the only appropriate means by which it can influence China to follow policies “compatible with Taiwan’s interests.” As a result Taiwan’s government must prevent any provocative stance on the issue of independence. Current trends also suggest a “continued shift in the cross-strait balance of power in the PRC’s favour,” which is not surprising given Taiwan’s declining military capabilities as mentioned previously. Taken together, this means that Taiwan is not likely to presently be the source of conflict in the region. Its constrained position does not allow it to make any claims about independence, one of the primary inciters for a China-led military offensive against Taiwan.

Conclusion

In summation, this essay argues that pro-independence desires in Taiwan along with continued US arms sales are the main drivers of conflict between China and Taiwan. As long as these conditions are in place, the potential for conflict will remain. In addition, the likelihood of conflict breaking out is exacerbated by China’s aggressive military build-up in the Taiwan Straits and the strengthening of the PLA in general. In the short-term, however, there are a number of factors preventing Taiwan from making any moves towards independence and risking conflict with China. These include growing economic integration between China and Taiwan, improved diplomatic relations through exchanges and cooperative efforts, the decline in US political and military support for Taiwan, and Taiwan’s isolated position vis-à-vis China and internationally. Not only do these factors decrease the likelihood of Taiwan provoking China, but they also mean that China will not easily resort to using military tactics against Taiwan, and may instead “exhaust all non-military means such as negotiations and diplomacy” first. Finally, it will be interesting to see what effect, if any, the recent protests for democracy in Hong Kong (and Beijing’s response to these), have on Taiwanese desires for independence not only amongst DPP supporters, but across the political spectrum. If pro-independence sentiment somehow erupts in Taiwan, then this will have serious implications for the likelihood of conflict occurring between China and Taiwan. In the meantime, the waiting game continues and observers are left hoping that the rapid improvement in cross-strait relations over the past few years is enough to deter a military clash between China and Taiwan.

Jennifer has recently completed a Master of International Relations from the University of Melbourne, and wrote her minor thesis on Chinese soft power towards the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. She is the Deputy Editor of Quarterly Access, and is currently working as a research assistant at the University of Melbourne’s Asia Institute. She is also managing a new online mentoring program for WhyDev and Monash University. Jennifer speaks Mandarin and Indonesian, and has interests in Chinese and Indonesian culture and foreign policy.

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