In an age marked by instant communication and 24-hour news, nearly all global events are accessible at the local level. From a coup d’état in Mauritania, to a bombing in Iraq or an earthquake in Chile, technology has severed the news gap between an event happening and it appearing on our screens. With this near instant access to newsworthy incidents globally, we have the ability to form opinions on events in real time as they unfold and regardless of their effect on us. The implications and consequences this can have on democratic societies contribute to the shaping of public opinion and how that affects governmental responses; the impact of which has shown to be profound. Through considering the case studies of Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, and the current refugee crisis in Europe, it is possible to understand the important role media plays in informing public opinion. Yet as these cases demonstrate, state responses to mass violence and genocide will vary according to public opinion or reshape public opinion itself.

The United States, Inaction, and Rwanda

The Rwandan Genocide, as a singular event, occurred between April and mid July in 1994. The scale and horror of the genocide has rendered it one of the most widely known historical events of the 1990s and has secured Rwanda’s place in our collective memory. This was not always the case. The genocide occurred within the wider context of the Rwandan Civil War, which had pitted the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a largely rebel Tutsi force, against the mostly Hutu Rwandan Government.^[1] The initial stages of this conflict were brought to a standstill with the Arusha Accords, signed in 1993. The accords intended to create a transitional government, with warring parties given proportional stakes. Refugees were to be repatriated and the rule of law to be re-established. As part of enforcing the accords, a peacekeeping force, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), was established. The mission was given a wide range of responsibilities, but was limited in scope and resources. These limitations reflected the circumstances in which the UN mission was developed: with widespread and costly UN missions already on the ground in twelve areas, the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) argued that the UN was overstretched. Large-scale missions in Cambodia and Somalia already drew significant resources and the US and UK argued that any new mission ought to be more affordable. Two major factors seemed to affect the US government’s decisions: the domestic political environment and the media cost of casualties.^[2]

Prior to leading the UN missions into Somalia, the US, under George H. Bush’ administration, had been opposed to intervention until a ceasefire was in place. It was only when major TV stations drew attention to the spreading famine, that a change of policy was considered. Once a wider audience knew of the millions of starving Somalis, the political cost of inaction and its consequences became apparent; under the glare of the media spotlight, the political necessity to intervene became clear.^[3] As the UN mission in Somalia began, led by the US, it seemed there was no limit to humanitarian intervention. President Bush, who had decided to commit to the mission before leaving office, stated,

“Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and effectively and, thus, save thousands of innocents from death”.^[4]

In this atmosphere of optimism, US forces stormed Somali beaches in December 1992 as the media’s cameras rolled. They eventually contributed 22,000 soldiers, with another twenty states contributing 17,000 more. However, as the mission stretched out, flaws became evident. Eighteen US Special Forces soldiers were killed on October 3 1993, in an incident that became known as the Battle of Mogadishu. The event revealed that public and domestic political opinion had firmly changed. It had swung away from the romanticised notions of the humanitarian intervention mission to a political and public relations disaster. Footage and photos of dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu to cheering crowds shocked audiences and ensured an end to any remaining goodwill.^[5] The incident caused the US to announce it would pull out of the mission, while encouraging other western nations to do the same.^[6]

After the Somali mission disaster, the US government faced significant domestic political pressure relating to UN interventions and costs. Congress attempted to pass an act that would have made it impossible for the President to commit US troops to UN operations. The government was also accused of allowing US foreign policy to be turned over to UN bureaucrats.^[7] The high cost of the US contribution to UN operations further sapped US governmental will to act. Two days after the Battle of Mogadishu, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was due to vote on the provision of peacekeepers to Rwanda.^[8] The unfortunate timing, coupled with the public relations fallout and domestic political pressure to limit costs, led to UNAMIR being a small and cheap peacekeeping mission. The US initially argued for a symbolic presence of only 100 soldiers, but contributed none. To cut costs further, the US, with the support of Russia and the UK, argued for a further reduction in the role of peacekeepers. Eventually the force, deployed in late 1993, would be composed of personnel from Belgium totalling 400, Bangladesh with 940, and Ghana offering 800.^[9] It was a far cry from the enthusiastic response to the call for intervention in Somalia just a year before.

When the genocide itself began in April 1994, the complete inadequacy of UNAMIR to carry out its mission goals was obvious. Despite the efforts of UNAMIR to protect senior Tutsi and moderate Hutu forces, many were killed, including Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The ten Belgian troops meant to protect her were also slain.^[10] The effect of these deaths was immediate. Within days, outraged public opinion in Belgium had pushed the Belgian government to send in 850 elite troops to withdraw all of its citizens and subsequently, its remaining forces from UNAMIR. The flow on effects of this policy decision based on adverse public opinion was tremendous. The opinion in Washington, already averse to intervention after Somalia, thought that the Belgian withdrawal was a further sign that they could not intervene. The impact on the ground was to remove any chance UNAMIR had to impede the genocide from proceeding.^[11]

Throughout the genocide, members of the UNSC and nations that had contributed to UNAMIR knew of the spreading killings. General Dallaire, commander of the mission, consistently reported to UN headquarters on the escalating violence.^[12] Despite this stream of information out of Rwanda, no extra action was taken. US and British officials continued to call for a complete withdrawal of forces, citing that a change in the mission may require extra troops and costs and that such an assertive policy was the undoing of the Somalia mission.^[13] As the death toll climbed, and despite what they knew, western governments including the US, UK, and France, played down the situation as a part of ‘a horrific civil war’ and refrained from using the term ‘genocide’. The Clinton administration specifically avoided using the term, so as to bypass criticism of their newfound non-intervention policy.^[14] Media reports largely echoed the government line, especially in the first few pivotal weeks. Early in the genocide, The Guardian wrote pieces about Rwandan gorillas, while The New York Times wrote of the “disintegration… into chaos and anarchy”.^[15] Unlike in Somalia, the relatively limited number of journalists in Rwanda hampered efforts to report on what was actually happening outside of government communiqués. When they did though, it was self-censored; photos of the killings were suppressed as there were deemed too graphic. A news piece filmed by a BBC crew based in Kenya was dropped for the same reason. The team were advised that any future reports should be shot at a wide angle, intended to make images less distinct; bodies were also often edited out of shots.^[16]

Unlike the reporting of the famine in Somalia, it took many weeks for sanitised reports and footage to come from Rwanda.^[17] With a lack of journalists in the region and the inadequate knowledge of Rwanda, news outlets had limited on the ground access to information. While there was some early reporting on the mounting death toll, reports did not come with the same visual stimuli that had been so impacting in Somalia.^[18] A lack of footage and photos to go with this information and an inability to easily distinguish the good from the bad, the story was not particularly compelling or one that was easy to tell.^[19]

As the genocide wore on towards its end, the reality of it became clearer to the media. Bodies were choking the Kagera River, and the trope of it merely being a part of a ‘civil war’ was wearing away. International figures including the Americans had begun to mention it as ‘genocide’ or ‘acts of genocide’.^[20] The RPF drew closer to ending the genocide by completing their conquest in mid July, and some two million Hutus fled across the borders into the Democratic Republic of Congo, then known as Zaire, and Tanzania. They moved into camps and were plagued with disease and other issues.^[21] The sight of a constant stream of poor and bedraggled faces made for a perfect media story and attracted considerable international coverage. By the end of July there were nearly 500 journalists and technicians in Goma, Zaire, many covering the new refugee tragedy by satellite. This coverage brought the scale of the tragedy to light and pushed the US and wider international community into action. One day after the RPF declared a unilateral ceasefire on July 20 1994, the US began a huge airlift. Within three days planes were on the ground in Goma, and 4000 US forces dispersed some $400 million worth of medical and food aid.^[22] The misery in the mostly Hutu refugee camps while horrifying, especially at the peak of 3000 deaths per day, paled in comparison to the situation Rwanda itself had been through without assistance.^[23] Without the considerable media presence in Goma, sufficient action may never have been taken.

In both the Somali and Rwandan cases, news coverage had an essential role in the response (or lack thereof) provided by the US and the international community. The coverage of each crisis affected public opinion and influenced the decision-making at the political level. There were both negative and positive consequences to this relationship between media, public perception, and government. The effect of little visual imagery, and sanitised imagery of the genocide itself, meant that reporting was unable to contradict the framing that numerous western governments provided. It also meant that stories did not have the same impact in the media cycle, and did not move public opinion in such a way as to create pressure for the US government to act.

Australia, Action, and East Timor

Australia and Indonesia have a long and at times fractious history. This is especially true in regard to East Timor, which had been a Portuguese colony, before brief independence in 1975. After less than two weeks of official independence, the East Timor was violently invaded by Indonesia with the tacit support of Australia and the US. This takeover led to a long campaign against insurgent East Timorese forces, often using tactics that amounted to war crimes, and then eventual incorporation into Indonesia.^[24] However, this incorporation was not harmonious, with the now Indonesian province seeing sporadic outbreaks of violence, such as the Dili Massacre in 1991, and as such requiring a constant military presence.

Despite occasional stories in Australian media over human rights concerns in Indonesia and activism from East Timorese and their supporters, the Australian government took the policy position of supporting East Timor within Indonesia. However this began to change in 1998, when the prevailing economic conditions triggered the resignation of President Suharto, long time leader of the New Order. It ushered in a new period known as ‘Reformasi‘, ruled over by former Vice-President, now President Habibie,^[25] pushing the long-suppressed discussion of the status of East Timor into the open. At the same time in the domestic political environment, the Australian government faced increased pressure for an independent East Timor.^[26] John Howard, then Australian Prime Minister, responded to growing domestic pressures, and took what he thought to be the most pragmatic course of action given the ructions in Indonesian politics and sent a letter to Habibie. It outlined a plan for an eventual self-determination vote and support for independence should the East Timorese vote for it. The letter angered Habibie so much, that he showed it to a range of top officials and decided to call a referendum.^[27] Habibie requested the UN administer the referendum and as a result, plans were laid out between Indonesia and Portugal, the last colonial ruler. The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was created, with hundreds of election officials and unarmed police being sent out in preparation for the referendum. Sporadic and increasing intimidation and violence began to rise, yet in spite this; nearly 100% of registered voters went to the polls.^[28]

After the vote on August 30 1999, which showed that an overwhelming majority had voted for independence, the violence escalated dramatically. Pro-Indonesian militia aided by members of the Indonesian Army tore through the country killing over 1000 people and destroying nearly all infrastructure. Within two and a half weeks, no home was left untouched with nearly all personal wealth looted and most houses burned. Hundreds of thousands fled to the mountains or over the border into West Timor.^[29] This violence in the presence of UNAMET officials, and media personnel on hand to witness it, caused a public outcry in Australia for something to be done. The Australian government had foreseen that violence was a likely outcome of any vote, and as early as March 1999 had moved an extra brigade to Darwin in preparation. A planning team was also formed to consider possible scenarios for intervention. Despite this forward planning, there was reluctance for unilateral intervention, given the very real possibility of violent confrontation between Australian troops and pro-Indonesian forces and the Indonesian army, and the potential for its escalation into a national war.^[30]

No matter these obstacles, public opinion within Australia was firmly in favour of intervention. The sense of ‘moral unease’ at the situation and that Australia had played a part in it since 1975, was supported by vehement media coverage. The Sydney Morning Herald argued that Australia “must lead the way – in force”.^[31] Polling released by the same paper on 14 September 1999 reflected the strength of public opinion for intervention, with 72% in support of peacekeeping and 34% supporting intervention, with or without UN support.^[32] As the Australian government ruled out unilateral action and sought UN and US support for intervention and Indonesian permission for it, they were in the words of Alexander Downer, then Foreign Minister, “forced to endure vociferous criticism”, something for which they were unlikely to survive if action were not taken.^[33]

This combination of forethought by the Australian government and significant domestic pressure on them, kept them committed to intervention. Australian, UN, US and other members of the international community’s diplomatic pressure on Indonesia ensured that they acquiesced to intervention; and the international forces in East Timor (InterFET), consisting mainly of Australian forces, were authorised on the 15th and deployed on the 20th September 1999.^[34] InterFET were able to stabilise and take control of East Timor and prevent further violence. While the Australian government had already planned for the eventual course of action that was taken in East Timor, the intense media coverage, backed by ample visual imagery, both supported their decision, and ensured that it was carried through.^[35]

Public Opinion, Media and Foreign Policy

In democratic states, public opinion matters. Due to the nature of democratic systems, politicians must consider public opinion in all decision making processes, especially in the lead up to elections.^[36] As to what extent public opinion affects these processes is questionable. There is no evidence to suggest that all policy decisions are derived from public opinion, especially foreign policy decisions. But public opinion does however have some impact and governments are, on occasion, prone to following it.^[37]

Public opinion, especially in regard to politics, is developed through the media in its role as the propagator of news and an agenda setter.^[38] The media can have this effect, as what they choose to focus on establishes public conversations around that story. They have long acted as gatekeepers, not only deciding the biggest topics of the day by virtue of their choice of which story to run, but also in framing the public conversation around that story. This framing is not done in a vacuum, but within the social and political context of the dominant culture.^[39] As the social and political context changes, so does the ability of media to focus on or frame a story. In the aftermath of the Cold War and with the development of new technologies, the changed context appeared to allow media to look outside the ‘prism of the Cold War’ and react far more quickly to international events.^[40] The possibility of real-time news reporting of events far away from home, an accelerated news cycle, and its supposed effect on public opinion, came to be known as the ‘CNN effect’.^[41] The advent and deep penetration of the Internet has further enhanced factors of the ‘CNN effect’, with news spreading at an even faster pace, while reducing the ability of traditional media to act as gatekeepers and agenda setters.^[42] In Australia, 99% of the population use the Internet and 79% do so daily, with that number rising far higher amongst younger demographics. Of that percentage, 68% have a social media account with the vast majority (93%) having a Facebook account. 40% of users stated that they used social media to “get information on news and current events.” With a Facebook user spending an average of eight and a half hours a week on the site, the power traditional media had to be gatekeepers or set the agenda has been substantially reduced by who or what the user sees on Facebook.^[43]

There is a growing consensus that the grand overarching narratives of state foreign policy, while not driven by public opinion, are certainly influenced by it. In individual circumstances of mass violence and genocide though, the ‘CNN effect’ can have a profound impact on public opinion and draw an immediate response from the state.^[44] It is important to note the necessity of visual imagery: that is photos and footage, on this effect. Reports of casualties, mass violence or even genocidal action have relatively little effect, but the ‘graphic portrayal of human tragedy’ is crucial in determining its impact on public opinion and through that, the state response to it.^[45] This is evinced in the US reaction to the Battle of Mogadishu and subsequent response to Hutu refugees flowing out of Rwanda after the genocide. Even with the visual imagery, how these crises were framed was crucial in determining the political impact of the story and allowed the US to act in a way that it felt appropriate.^[46] In the absence of overt visual imagery, the ability of the state to set and frame the way in which a story is reported is enhanced.^[47]

With the changing role of traditional news media and the profound power of social media as a source of 24-hour news, we can see that the ‘graphic portrayal of human tragedy’ is creating new waves of response in public opinion and government decision-making. A recent example of this is the death of Alan Kurdi in September 2015. While the Syrian refugee crisis had been escalating for some time and had been widely reported on, the image of Alan dead on a Turkish beach brought the issue to the forefront. The particularly graphic and confronting nature of the images had a significant impact on European public opinion of the crisis.^[48] While many traditional media outlets chose not to publish the most graphic of the images, its presence on social media ensured it was seen globally. In the days after, many European state leaders expressed shock and sorrow at his death and promised policies more compassionate to refugees. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, declared “The right to political asylum has no limits on the number of asylum seekers”.^[49] Some news outlets, previously hostile towards taking in refugees, struck a more conciliatory tone, and his death propelled the refugee crisis to the forefront of the Canadian federal election.^[50] While the image may not have spurred a timely end to the crisis, it cut through all other news and brought the human cost and immediacy of the crisis into public consciousness globally and spurred political action.

Conclusion

In the media driven political landscape, it can be easy to assume that democratically elected political leaders are only acting in self interest – that is, they are acting up and saying what they need to say to ensure their own positive public polling. That the ‘CNN effect’ of wall-to-wall news ensures political leaders respond to mass violence and genocide as per the prevailing winds of public opinion; this view is a black and white one, without nuance and does not reflect reality. In responding to mass violence and genocide in other states, political leaders have to balance their need to heed public opinion, but also to act according to what they consider the best interests of the state. They are in a unique position to utilise positive public opinion to justify what they consider morally just action against any opposition, but they are also in a position to sway public opinion in favour of that morally just action. In the case of East Timor, the Australian government saw an opportunity in the changing political landscape of Indonesia to amend their foreign policy and correct the ‘moral unease’ they felt over it, and to carry the public with them in that choice.^[51] With firm public opinion on their side, they were able to make a bold change of policy and see it through. Alternatively, in the US case in Rwanda, the Clinton administration’s disingenuous reporting of the situation on the ground, so as to support their prior decision not to intervene, and a relative lack of media coverage to counter that narrative, worked together to create a situation where there was no governmental support for action and no public imperative for it either. It is entirely possible that the Clinton administration could have swayed public opinion in favour of intervention, should they have chosen to do so. This can be seen in the response to the post-genocidal refugee crisis, which the public were supportive of. It is clear that rather than being determined principally by public opinion, democratic state responses to mass violence and genocide are both influenced by, and influence, public opinion; especially where independent media coverage is insufficient or absent.

References

^[1] Melvern, Linda (2000) A people betrayed. The role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide. Zed-Books: London.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Mermin, Jonathan (1999) Debating war and peace: Media coverage of US intervention in the post-Vietnam era. Princeton University Press: Princeton., Carr, Caleb (1993). “The consequences of Somalia.” in World Policy Journal Vol. 10, No. 3, 1.

^[4] Melvern, Linda (2000) A people betrayed. The role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide. Zed-Books: London.

^[5] There is extensive footage available on YouTube., Dauber, Cori. (2001) “Image as argument: The impact of Mogadishu on US military intervention.” in Armed Forces & Society Vol. 27, No. 2, 205.

^[6] Melvern, Linda (2000) A people betrayed. The role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide. Zed-Books: London.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Ibid.

^[9] Ibid., Klinghoffer, Arthur. (1998). The international dimension of genocide in Rwanda. New York University Press: New York City.

^[10] Melvern, Linda (2006) Conspiracy to murder: The Rwandan genocide. Verso: New York City.

^[11] Burkhalter, Holly. (1994). “The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration and Rwanda” in World Policy Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4, 44.

^[12] Des Forges, Alison & Human Rights Watch & International Federation of Human Rights (1999) ” Leave none to tell the story”: Genocide in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch: New York City.

^[13] Ibid.

^[14] Schimmel, Noam (2011) “An invisible genocide: how the Western media failed to report the 1994 Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi and why.” in The International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 15, No. 7, 1126., The Guardian (2004) US chose to ignore Rwandan genocide, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/31/usa.rwanda, 11 March 2017.

^[15] Schimmel, Noam (2011) “An invisible genocide: how the Western media failed to report the 1994 Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi and why.” in The International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 15, No. 7, 1126.

^[16] Ibid.

^[17] Carr, Caleb (1993) “The consequences of Somalia.” in World Policy Journal Vol. 10, No. 3, 1.

^[18] Power, Samantha (2001) “Bystanders to genocide.” in Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 288, No. 2, 84.

^[19] Schimmel, Noam (2011) “An invisible genocide: how the Western media failed to report the 1994 Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi and why.” in The International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 15, No. 7, 1126.

^[20] Power, Samantha (2001) “Bystanders to genocide.” in Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 288, No. 2, 84.

^[21] Peacock, Dorinda Lea. (1997). “’It happened and it can happen again’: The international response to genocide in Rwanda.” in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, Vol. 22, No. 3, 918.

^[22] Melvern, Linda (2006) Conspiracy to murder: The Rwandan genocide. Verso: New York City.

^[23] Dallaire, Romeo (2003) Shake hands with the devil : The failure of humanity in Rwanda. Random House Canada: Toronto.

^[24] Schorr, Daniel, “Intervention in East Timor” in The Christian Science Monitor: Boston, MA. September 10 1999, p. 11., Fernandes, Clinton (2015) “Accomplice to Mass Atrocities: The International Community and Indonesia’s Invasion of East Timor.” in Politics and Governance, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1.

^[25] Mcdougall, Derek & Kingsley Edney (2010) “Howard’s way? Public opinion as an influence on Australia’s engagement with Asia, 1996–2007” in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, 214.

^[26] Smith, Gary & David Lowe (2005) “Howard, Downer and the Liberals’ realist tradition” in The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 51, No. 3, 464.

^[27] He, Kai (2008) “ Indonesia’s foreign policy after Soeharto: International pressure, democratization, and policy change” in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No. 1, 56., ABC News (2008) Howard pushed me on E Timor referendum: Habibie, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-11-16/howard-pushed-me-on-e-timor-referendum-habibie/207044, 11 March 2017.

^[28] Traub, James (2000) “Inventing East Timor” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, 74.

^[29] Ibid, Cohen, Michael & Andrew O’Neil (2015) “Doubts down under: American extended deterrence, Australia, and the 1999 East Timor crisis” in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol 15, No. 1, 37., He, Kai (2008) “ Indonesia’s foreign policy after Soeharto: International pressure, democratization, and policy change” in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No. 1, 56.

^[30] Cohen, Michael & Andrew O’Neil (2015) “Doubts down under: American extended deterrence, Australia, and the 1999 East Timor crisis” in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol 15, No. 1, 37., Cotton, James (2001) “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention” Survival, Vol 43, No. 1, 131.

^[31] Smith, Gary & David Lowe (2005) “Howard, Downer and the Liberals’ realist tradition” in The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 51, No. 3, 464., Cohen, Michael & Andrew O’Neil (2015) “Doubts down under: American extended deterrence, Australia, and the 1999 East Timor crisis” in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol 15, No. 1, 37., Jago, Marianne (2010) “InterFET: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor” in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 3, 386, 387.

^[32] Mcdougall, Derek & Kingsley Edney (2010) “Howard’s way? Public opinion as an influence on Australia’s engagement with Asia, 1996–2007” in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, 214., As a personal note, I recall there being petitions left at the local library calling for the government to intervene.

^[33] Mcdougall, Derek & Kingsley Edney (2010) “Howard’s way? Public opinion as an influence on Australia’s engagement with Asia, 1996–2007” in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, 214, 215., Jago, Marianne (2010) “InterFET: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor” in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 3, 386.

^[34] Ibid.

^[35] Ibid.

^[36] Kennamer, J. David (1994) Public opinion, the press, and public policy. Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT.

^[37] Burstein, Paul (2003) “The impact of public opinion on public policy: A review and an agenda” in Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 1, 29.

^[38] McCombs, Maxwell (2004) Setting the agenda: The mass media and public opinion. Polity Press: Cambridge.

^[39] Kennamer, J. David (1994) Public opinion, the press, and public policy. Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT.

^[40] Robinson, Piers (1999) “The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy?” in Review of international studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, 301.

^[41] Ibid.

^[42] Bahador, Babak (2007) The CNN Effect in Action: How the News Media Pushed the West toward War in Kosovo. Palgrave Macmillan US: New York City.

^[43] Sensis (2015) Sensis Social Media Report 2015, https://www.sensis.com.au/asset/PDFdirectory/Sensis_Social_Media_Report_2015.pdf, 11 March 2017

^[44] Mcdougall, Derek & Kingsley Edney (2010) “Howard’s way? Public opinion as an influence on Australia’s engagement with Asia, 1996–2007” in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, 207., Kennamer, J. David (1994) Public opinion, the press, and public policy. Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT.

^[45] Shaw, Martin (1996). Civil society and media in global crises : representing distant violence. Pinter, London

^[46] Dauber, Cori. (2001) “Image as argument: The impact of Mogadishu on US military intervention.” in Armed Forces & Society Vol. 27, No. 2, 205. 211-212., Schimmel, Noam (2011) “An invisible genocide: how the Western media failed to report the 1994 Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi and why.” in The International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 15, No. 7, 1126.

^[47] Robinson, Piers (1999) “The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy?” in Review of international studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, 301.

^[48] The University Of Sheffield (2016) Alan Kurdi A Year On: How An Image Transformed The Debate On Immigration, https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/news/nr/alan-kurdi-immigration-debate-twitter-1.641251, 11 March 2017.

^[49] Independent.ie (2015) Germany’s Angela Merkel Says No Numbers Limits To Right To Asylum, http://www.independent.ie/world-news/germanys-angela-merkel-says-no-numbers-limits-to-right-to-asylum-31504442.html, 11 March 2017.

^[50] Patrick Kingsley (2016) The Death Of Alan Kurdi: One Year On, Compassion Towards Refugees Fades., https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/01/alan-kurdi-death-one-year-on-compassion-towards-refugees-fades, 11 March 2017.

^[51] Jago, Marianne (2010) “InterFET: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor” in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 3, 386.