The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in Vienna on 14 July 2015 by Iran, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany (P5+1). In exchange for co-operation on its nuclear programme, involving regular inspections by the International Atomic Agency (IAEA), nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union are being lifted in stages. On 16 January 2016, Implementation Day, this process began, though the United States did impose new, albeit limited, sanctions after an Iranian ballistic missile test.^[1]

The JCPOA potentially signifies Iran’s re-integration into the global economy. For instance, Iran can now access the international banking system, and deal in US dollars. However, internal tensions have the potential to hold Iran back. Many of those in power, especially in the army and the clerical establishment, want to retain the status quo to defend their own interests. Coupled with the country’s prevailing conservatism and its deep distrust of America and the West, there is no guarantee that Iran will open up smoothly to international business in the near future.

The elections that took place on 26 February 2016 were a litmus test for President Rouhani’s nuclear deal. Ballots were held for the 290-seat legislative body, the Majlis, and for the Assembly of Experts, which selects the Supreme Leader and is made up of 88 clerics. There is vigorous political debate in Iran, and though there have been severe crackdowns on freedom of speech in the last eighteen months, elections are generally regarded to be free within certain parameters. In the weeks leading up to the election the Guardian Council, a 12-man religious body selected by the Majlis and the Supreme Leader, disqualified a number of candidates supportive of Rouhani, including Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran.^[2] This was emblematic of the continuing tension between the conservative hardliners and the more outward-looking reformists.

Although official election results have not been released, and there will be run-offs in 68 constituencies where candidates won less than 25% of the vote, the reformist-moderate grouping appear to have secured an increased proportion of seats in the Majlis and the Assembly of Experts.^[3] Reuters have estimated that conservatives won 112 seats, reformists and centrists 90, and independents and religious minorities 29.^[4] In Tehran, the reformist group, the “List of Hope” won all 30 parliamentary seats.^[5] Even if Tehran is traditionally the least conservative area, it is still an impressive victory. Thus the election may have resulted in a parliament that is more acquiescent to a foreign policy which engages Western nations.

In order to understand the election results, one must appreciate Iran’s political history and governance structures. One of the central aspects of the Iranian political system is the concept of wilayat al-faqih, the Guardianship of the Jurist, which legitimises the Supreme Leader’s power using Shi’ite Islamic theology.

The Shi’ite-Sunni split derives from a disagreement over the successor of the Prophet Muhammad (570-632 A.D.). Sunnis believe that the leaders of the community who followed him were legitimate. In contrast, Shi’ites believe that the Prophet’s cousin, ‘Ali Abi Talib, should have been his immediate successor. Instead, there were three leaders before ‘Ali, leaders that Sunnis describe as the four “Rightly Guided Caliphs”. Eventually, in the eyes of the Shi’a, Ali took possession of Muhammad’s religious and temporal authority, wilaya, which gave him the right to lead the Muslim community. Thus ‘Ali was a wali, one vested with the authority of God.^[6] This power was passed down through ‘Ali’s male line of descent until it reached the Twelfth Imam, known as the Mahdi, in the late ninth century.^[7] However, the Mahdi disappeared in 973, leaving what became known as the Twelver Shi’ite community without a recognised leader. The absence is known as the Occultation of the Hidden Imam. The Twelvers expect him to re-appear in the future, though they have been waiting for him for rather a long time. Consequently, Shi’ite religious scholars or clerics, the ‘ulama,^[8] regarded all temporal authority as illegitimate, though they retained the religious authority of wilaya.^[9] The jurists had to consider what would happen to the Mahdi’s political power during his occultation.

The ‘ulama had divergent opinions on whether political authority could be justified given the Occultation.^[10] In this respect, Shi’ite political thought in this respect is disjointed and contradictory. During the Safavid period (1501-1736) scholars generally took three positions: wholesale rejection; compromise; or enthusiastic endorsement. Even if they took the latter stance, they never envisioned themselves, the holders of the religious authority of wilaya, as rulers.^[11] The majority attempted to justify the monarchy without bringing it within the Shi’ite religious framework. This Shi’ite political quietism was traditional, and continued in the Qajar era (1785-1925), but there were more instances of religious scholars and jurists behaving politically. For instance, the clergy opposed the rulers during the 1890-1 Tobacco Protest and the 1905-11 Iranian Constitutional Revolution, even though the notion of wilayat al-faqih was not used in any of the disputes.^[12] Throughout these dynasties the ‘ulama always held some degree of political power, acting as a check upon the ruling powers, but they never explicitly sought to implement religious rule.

To begin with, Ayatollah Rudhollah Khomeini, the figurehead of the 1979 revolution, worked within this quietist tradition, writing on mysticism, gnostic spirituality, and philosophy. Martin has argued that in Kashf al-asrar (Revealing the Secret), Khomeini’s first political work published in 1943, he does not present a theory of the state.^[13] In fact, he presents the notion of wilayat al-faqih as the widely-recognised role of the ‘ulama as spiritual leaders and advisors about religious law to the ruler. Throughout the text, Khomeini states that the qualified Islamic jurists, fuqaha, should not rule; rather they should guide the monarch with the interests of Islam and the nation in mind.^[14] In this sense Khomeini was acting within the traditional paradigm that the clerics should supervise the sovereign whilst upholding the status quo.

However, Khomeini’s ultimate conception of wilayat al-faqih is substantially different to historical Shi’ite political theory. Like all political actors he was shaped by events. He radically altered his quietist position after he was exiled in 1964 and the Shah continued his close relationships with Britain and the United States. He began to regard Islam as inherently political, “Islam is a political religion, every aspect of it is political, even worship.”^[15] This led to his claim prior to the revolution that, “the fuqaha are entitled to exercise all the worldly functions of the Prophet”.^[16] He began to argue forcefully that a faqih (an Islamic jurist, singular of fuqaha) should take on substantive political power. Khomeini explicitly redefined the concept of wilayat al-faqih to include state power, which overcame the split between temporal and spiritual authority.

Accordingly Khomeini’s doctrine appears to place the authority of the faqih on the same level as the Prophet and the Mahdi.^[17] However, Khomeini tried to make clear that he was referring to the functions of the faqih rather than their status^[18]. He was allowing the faqih to assume the governing responsibilities of the Mahdi, whilst excluding the idea that they had to be infallible. This meant Khomeini’s wilayat al-faqih included “worldly” powers, yet excluded jurists from holding any “substantive” or “existential” (takwiniyyah) wilaya.^[19] Ultimately, Khomeini’s wilayat al-faqih was an innovative response to the question of who is legitimately qualified to rule during the Occultation of the Mahdi, and provided the theoretical foundation for the 1979 revolution.

Though ‘Islamic government’ (hokumat-I Islami) was one of the most conspicuous slogans of the revolution, Khomeini did not publicly advocate wilayat al-faqih, nor was there any discussion of it during the constitution’s drafting.^[20] Despite this, the final draft, which remains in use today, relies on the concept. Article 5 demonstrates this, “During the Occultation of the Lord of the Age (may God hasten his renewed manifestation!), the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the just and pious faqih”.^[21] Article 110 gives the faqih the power to declare war and peace, mobilise the armed forces, and appoint the supreme judicial authorities,^[22] giving him similar powers to the President of the United States as laid out in their constitution. For the first time, the clergy had taken control of the state.

Khomeini had a large degree of control over the country after the revolution. He was named personally in Article 107 of the Constitution as the universally recognised faqih who took on the wilaya of the Mahdi.^[23] In this sense the state’s legitimacy relied upon Khomeini’s vast popularity, stemming from his opposition to the Shah’s government, and his large networks within the army and other institutions.^[24] As Mavani has noted, rather than relying upon an explicit legal structure, new legislation depended on Khomeini’s seal of approval, ‘his fatwa was law’.^[25] With an arm of the army dedicated to him, the Revolutionary Guards, whilst sitting above the Guardian Council, made up of Islamic clerics and jurists, and the 290-member Majlis, Supreme Leader Khomeini really was supreme.

The clergy have managed to retain political power even after his death in 1989. Importantly, the constitution’s definition of wilayat al-faqih had been altered, removing the conditions that the faqih was a mujtahid, an original authority in Islamic law, and accepted by the majority of the population. This allowed Ali Khamenei, the incumbent President, to be appointed by the Assembly of Experts as faqih without necessarily having adequate Islamic legal credentials and avoiding a popular vote.^[26] This is a clear modification of Khomeini’s view in his 1970 lectures Vilayat al-faqih,^[27] where he spoke of the incumbent faqih as the one with the greatest knowledge of Shi’ite jurisprudence. This demonstrates that political concerns are prioritised above doctrinal or religious purity.

In practice, the concept of wilayat al-faqih means that the Iranian Shi’ite clergy continue to hold the balance of power in Iran. It provides the constitutional basis for the Supreme Leader and ascribes many of the executive functions to him. Furthermore, it gives the ‘ulama ultimate control over the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts. This is Khomeini’s legacy; he insisted that only an Islamic government could implement the sacred laws of the shari’a.^[28]

However, the lifting of sanctions is a clear sign that the reformist powers have made significant progress. The elections were the visible battleground for a complicated, fragmented conflict between reformists and hard-liners that has been on-going since Khomeini’s death.^[29] States and businesses will have to negotiate this shifting landscape cautiously, which includes a political establishment fraught with internal tension, partly down to the concept of wilayat al-faqih.

Dominic Williams is an intern at Dragoman Pty Ltd. Previously, he worked in the International Economics Department at Chatham House. He recently graduated with a degree in Politics, Philosophy and Economics.

[1] BBC (2016) “Iran: US imposes new sanctions over missile test,” BBC News, 17 January 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35338901.

[2] Hafezi, Parisa (2016) “Iran clerics criticise mass disqualification of candidates – website,” Reuters, 21 January 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-election-candidates-idUKKCN0UZ2XZ.

[3] Erdbrink, Thomas (2016) “Doubts Rise in Iran About Conclusive Election results,” The New York Times, 2 March 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world/middleeast/iran-elections.html?_r=0.

[4] BBC (2016) “Election results show Iranians want end to confrontation – Rouhani,” BBC News, 1 March 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35695689.

[5] It should be noted that candidates do not run in parties, but loose coalitions or lists (and possibly several), so it is often difficult to classify them. Kishi, Katayoun (2016) “Iran’s Election Coalitions,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, 24 February 2016, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/feb/24/irans-election-coalitions.

[6] Wali can also be translated as “friend”, “custodian”, or “protector”. In a theological or political context it is usually understood as one who has God’s authority. Isfahani, A. (1954 [1874]) Tafsir Mi’at al-Anwar was Mishkat al-Asrar, Tehran: Chapkhaneh A/-tab, 336.

[7] Lawson, Todd (2001) “Fatima’s religious authority in an early work by the Bab” in Walbridge, Linda S. (ed.) The Most Learned of the Shi’a, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 96-7.

[8] Note that ‘ulama can refer to any group of Islamic religious scholars, irrespective of their sect.

[9] Turner, Colin (1995) “Still waiting for the Imam? The unresolved question of Intizar in Twelver Shi’ism” in Persica XV, 39.

[10] Akhavi, Shahrough (1996) “Contending discourse in Shi’i law on the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih” in Iranian Studies 29 (3/4).

[11] Ghamari-Tabrizi, Behrooz (2014) ‘The Divine, the People and the Faqih: On Khomeini’s Theory of Sovereignty’ in Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin (ed.) A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, 225.

[12] Akhavi (1996), 236.

[13] Martin, Vanessa (1993) “Religion and State in Khumaini’s “Kashf al-asrar”” in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 56 (1), 39,42.

[14] Ghamari-Tabrizi (2014), 215.

[15] Khomeini, Ruhollah (1994) Sahifeh-ye Nur, vol. ix (Tehran: The Institute for the Publication of Imam’s Works), 136.

[16] Khomeini, Ruhollah (1980) Velayat-e faqih, Tehran: Amir Kabir, 172.

[17] Mavani, Hamid (2001) ‘Analysis of Khomeini’s proofs for al-wilaya al-mutlaqa (comprehensive authority) of the jurist’ in Walbridge, Linda S. (ed.) The Most Learned of the Shi’a, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 183.

[18] Khomeini (1988), 162.

[19] Akhavi (1996), 240.

[20] Milani, Mohsen M. (1992) “The transformation of the velayat-e faqih institution: from Khomeini to Khamenei” in Muslim World 82 (3), 176. See Rahnema, Ali (2014) ‘Ayatollah Khomeini’s Rule of the Guardian Jurist: From Theory to Practice’ in Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin (ed.) A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, 88-114 for a comprehensive examination of the drafting process.

[21] Iran and Algar, Hamid (trans.) (1980) Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 29.

[22] Ibid., 71.

[23] Ibid., 66.

[24] Algar, Hamid (1972) ‘The oppositional role of the ulama in twentieth-century Iran’ in Keddie, Nikki R. (ed.) Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions since 1500, California: University of California Press, 245.

[25] Mavani (2001), 180.

[26] Milani 1992, 185.

[27] Khomeini referred to wilayat al-faqih using the Iranian spelling, replacing the “w” with a “v”.

[28] Khomeini, Ruhollah and Algar, Hamid (trans.) (1981) Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 62.

[29] Ignatius, David (2016) “A political prize fight looms in Tehran,” The Washington Post, 7 January 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-political-prize-fight-in-tehran/2016/01/07/822bc8c2-b584-11e5-9388-466021d971de_story.html; Ignatius, David (2015) “Despite the nuclear deal, Iran continues its economic sabotage,” The Washington Post, 19 December 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/iran-is-not-yet-open-for-business/2015/12/29/83deab38-ae42-11e5-9ab0-884d1cc4b33e_story.html.