



AIIA Policy Commentary

Two Elections that Matter: India and Indonesia

The Great Indian Election

Amitabh Mattoo and Nirupama Subramanian

India's Foreign Policy after the Elections

Rajiv Bhatia

Indonesia's Legislative Elections:

The Importance of Money and
Personalities

Greg Fealy

Implications of the Elections for Australia-Indonesia
Relations and Indonesia's Place in the World

Natalie Sambhi

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Preface

The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) was established in 1924 as an independent, non-profit organisation seeking to promote interest in, and understanding of, international affairs in Australia.

The AIIA provides a wide range of opportunities for the dissemination of information and free expression of views on these matters through discussion and publication. Precluded by its constitution from expressing any opinion of its own on international affairs, the AIIA provides a forum for the presentation, discussion and dissemination of a wide range of views.

The AIIA's series of Policy Commentaries aims to provide informed opinion and useful source documents on issues of topical concern to encourage debate among AIIA members, the media and the general public.

The Commentaries are edited by Melissa Conley Tyler, National Executive Director in the AIIA National Office, Canberra. I hope that you will find the current commentary timely and informative. This issue will be the final in the AIIA Policy Commentary series with the launch of the AIIA's redeveloped website: www.internationalaffairs.org.au.

Associate Professor Shirley Scott
Research Chair
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Series Editor 2013-2014

Editorial

In a democracy, the vote of the population can change a nation. In mid-2014 two hugely populous nations will undergo democratic elections: India and Indonesia. The upcoming elections in these two vitally important countries to Australia will see more than one billion people exercise their right to democratic vote. The results of these elections will have significant domestic, regional and global impacts. This policy commentary provides an analysis of both elections as well as their broader implications.

In India, the elections will be the largest of their kind in human history. The two major competing parties, the ruling Indian National Congress Party (Congress) and the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are competing for their share of 815 million votes. While a Congress victory is widely predicted to see a continuation of the same domestic and foreign policy priorities, a BJP victory would likely see a new direction for India. Whichever party is elected will face significant challenges: the Indian economy has stagnated and the population at large seeks real change.

The contribution by Professor Amitabh Mattoo and Nirupama Subramanian of the Australia India Institute provides an overview of the Indian election that highlights the challenges for the future. Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia of the Indian Council of World Affairs examines the potential implications of India's election choice on its future foreign policy and what this could mean for Australia. Both contributors highlight the challenges and opportunities that the election bring for India.

For Indonesia, the recent parliamentary elections will have a significant impact on the presidential elections to be held in July. Popular front-runner Joko Widodo of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle did not do as well as predicted and this will have interesting consequences for the elections in July. Jokowi may have the popularity factor, but has not yet expressed a vision for foreign policy. Retired Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto has a nationalistic vision for Indonesia but controversy surrounding his human rights record may hinder his chances. The outcome

of the election will shape the direction of Indonesia, a country of increasingly regional and international clout, in the future.

ANU Associate Professor Greg Fealy examines the recent Indonesian parliamentary elections and what the initial results spell for the presidential elections in July. Natalie Sambhi, an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, looks at what the Indonesian presidential elections will mean for Indonesian foreign policy and future strategic outlook.

India and Indonesia represent two important political and economic relationships for Australia. The elections may create a newly invigorated atmosphere for increased cooperation or may produce something else. In any case, it is important to study the elections and potential implications for each country and for Australia in order to best prepare for leadership change in these key countries. This AIIA policy commentary hopes to contribute to stimulating greater discussion of the potential for change in India and Indonesia.

Melissa H. Conley Tyler
National Executive Director
Australian Institute of International Affairs

Speech to Confederation of Indian Industries by Minister for Foreign Affairs the Hon Julie Bishop MP, Mumbai, 16 November 2013*

[...] Our government recognizes that India is vital to Australia's strategic and economic thinking. India is an economic, political and strategic powerhouse and a mega democracy with increasing global influence. It has the potential to be one of our most valuable and strategic partners yet Australia had seemed slow to fully come to terms with India's regional and global significance and why a deeper and stronger and more diversified relationship is in Australia's interest.

I can assure you, the new Australian government understands this fully.

For decades Australian foreign policy has focused on relations in the Asia Pacific, the east-Asia giants of Japan and South Korea and more recently China and Indonesia. Our closest ally, the United States has been a dominant economic and military force in the Asia Pacific and I believe will continue to be so. However Australia is also a nation of the Indian Ocean and I see and describe our region as the Indo Pacific which means our focus must also include India. Our common interests in the Indo-Pacific are growing and converging. [...]

It is true that India has become more engaged in regional affairs, including through the two-decade old 'Look East' policy and we must engage India broadly in the Indo-Pacific.

This region – stretching from the Arabian Sea to the Sea of Japan and to the shores of The Americas – represents a new centre of gravity for our economic and strategic interests.

* Available online (accessed 23 April 2014):
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2013/jb_sp_131117.aspx?minis terid=4

In the Indo-Pacific arc, growing trade, investment and energy flows are strengthening economic and security interdependency.

Bringing the strategic interests of India and Australia together in an unprecedented way is tying our economies closer together.

Increasingly, we see ourselves as true partners working together to support regional security and regional prosperity. [...]

Bharatiya Janata Party Election Manifesto 2014*

[...] BJP believes a resurgent India must get its rightful place in the comity of nations and international institutions. The vision is to fundamentally reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals, content and process, in a manner that locates India's global strategic engagement in a new paradigm and on a wider canvass, that is not just limited to political diplomacy, but also includes our economic, scientific, cultural, political and security interests, both regional and global, on the principles of equality and mutuality, so that it leads to an economically stronger India, and its voice is heard in the international fora.

BJP believes that political stability, progress and peace in the region are essential for south Asia's growth and development. The Congress-led UPA has failed to establish enduring friendly and cooperative relations with India's neighbours. India's relations with traditional allies have turned cold. India and its neighbours have drifted apart. Instead of clarity, we have seen confusion. The absence of statecraft has never been felt so acutely as today. India is seen to be floundering, whereas it should have been engaging with the world with confidence. The collapse of the Indian economy has contributed to the sorry state of foreign affairs in no small measure.

[...] We will revive Brand India with the help of our strengths of **5 T's: Tradition, Talent, Tourism, Trade and Technology**. Guiding Principles of our Foreign Policy will be:

- Equations will be mended through pragmatism and a doctrine of mutually beneficial and interlocking relationships, based on enlightened national interest.
- We will champion uniform international opinion on issues like Terrorism and **Global Warming**.

* Available online (accessed 23 April 2014):
<http://bjpelectionmanifesto.com/pdf/manifesto2014.pdf>

- Instead of being led by big power interests, we will engage proactively on our own with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond.
- In our **neighbourhood** we will pursue friendly relations. However, where required we will not hesitate from taking strong stand and steps.
- We will work towards strengthening **Regional forums** like SAARC and ASEAN.
- We will continue our dialogue, engagement and cooperation, with global forums like BRICS, G20, IBSA, SCO and ASEM. States will be encouraged to play a greater role in diplomacy; actively building relations with foreign countries to harness their mutual cultural and commercial strengths.

Also,

- We will expand and empower our pool of **diplomats**, ensuring our message is taken to the world and our great nation represented on the whole in a befitting manner.
- The NRIs, PIOs and professionals settled abroad are a vast reservoir to articulate the national interests and affairs globally. This resource will be harnessed for strengthening Brand India.
- India shall remain a natural home for persecuted Hindus and they shall be welcome to seek refuge here. [...]

The Indian National Congress, Lok Sabha Elections 2014: Manifesto*

[...] The Indian National Congress is committed to the articulation and implementation of a robust and dynamic foreign policy. The Indian National Congress remains committed to building peaceful, stable and mutually beneficial relations with all major powers and all our Asian neighbours.

1. India will continue to benefit from global opportunities and contribute to world-wide efforts in creating and managing institutions to deal with challenges like climate change and sustainable development, non-proliferation, international trade and cross-border terrorism.
2. The Indian National Congress will strive to mobilize support for India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council.
3. Global Terrorism must be combatted with determination and cooperation. We will be engaged in creating a robust framework of intelligence sharing, cutting out financial flows to terrorist outfits, and stopping money laundering, to address the issue of terrorism.
4. India has emerged as a critical bridge between the developed world and the developing world, along with Brazil, China and South Africa. At the same time we have our own unique position that combines the cumulative heritage of Non-Aligned-Movement and its advocacy of freedom for African countries and steady support for Palestine. We will continue to support the goodwill nurtured for decades amongst socialist countries.
5. We will work to strengthen the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) framework and endeavour to meaningfully realise a South Asian economy community, as

* Available online (accessed 23 April 2014):
<http://www.inc.in/images/Pages/English%20Manifesto%20for%20Web.pdf>

economic engagement is critical to realising the true potential of this region.

6. We expect to proceed with our mutual efforts with China to work through established instruments towards a resolution of differences of perception about the border and the Line of Actual Control (LAC), even as our economic cooperation and multi-lateral cooperation continue to grow. [...]
7. For Afghanistan, we believe the real threat is not within but from terrorism from beyond its borders. If the peace process remains Afghan owned and Afghan driven, we will work to support it.
8. On Pakistan we will encourage the new government's stated position to improve relations with India but calibrate the dialogue consistent with delivery on accountability for 26/11 as well as dismantling of the infrastructure of terrorism on Pakistani soil.
9. On Sri Lanka, we will engage with that country to ensure that the Tamil-speaking people and other minorities have full equality and equal rights under the law. We will continue to press the Government of Sri Lanka to implement the 13th Amendment and create autonomous provinces, especially the provinces of the North and the East.
10. Protecting Indians overseas from exploitation or threats will remain a paramount concern of the Indian National Congress.

[...]

Aam Aadmi Party National Manifesto 2014*

[...] India's foreign policy would focus on establishing friendly and cordial relationships with all countries, on equal terms. Towards this end, we believe in:

- i. Zero tolerance policy towards cross-border terrorism. Coordinate bilateral and multilateral efforts to prosecute terrorists and for better border management. Call for sustained dialogue at various levels to dismantle the structures that encourage terrorism.
- ii. Reducing political hostilities in our immediate neighbourhood through confidence building, and providing development and relief assistance to our neighbours.
- iii. While enhancing the capacity to deter border incursions by China, focus of Sino-Indian relations to be shifted to greater and more balanced trade and recover Sino-Indian civilisational exchange.
- iv. Develop border areas as zones of high economic engagement to create a larger constituency for peace on both sides and tackle illegal immigration.
- v. Supplement India's meaningful engagement with the US, with that of other blocs such as the BRICS, and IBSA and encourage a multi-polar world. Promote the legitimacy and power of truly global institutions such as the UN and demand democratization of bodies such as IMF.
- vi. Continue to play an active role in protecting agricultural and rural communities in the developing world against first world subsidies through WTO.

* Available online (accessed 23 April 2014): <http://www.aamaadmiparty.org/aap-manifesto-2014>

- vii. Advocate UN oversight of all global commons and enhance cooperation on the ecological crisis. Demand greater investment in renewable energy and transfer of technology from the developed countries as they remain the predominant consumers of fossil fuel energy and drivers of climate change. This is integral to our energy and economic security. [...]

Joint Communiqué, The President of the Republic of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of Australia, Jakarta, 30 September 2013*

1. At the invitation of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, H.E Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Honourable Tony Abbott MP, paid his first official overseas visit to Indonesia on 30 September - 1 October 2013.
2. Both leaders expressed satisfaction with the continued enhancement of the comprehensive partnership between the two neighbouring democracies, which is built on the basis of mutual respect and mutual commitments for progress, prosperity and security of both countries.
3. The leaders reaffirmed the two countries' continued adherence to the principle of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity as stipulated in the Lombok Treaty.
4. The two leaders renewed their commitment to the strong bilateral political architecture of annual leaders' meetings and strategic dialogue through 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministers' meetings in addition to other regular Ministerial level meetings.
5. The two leaders underscored the importance of continuing to work closely within the bilateral, regional and global frameworks in maintaining peace and stability as well as advancing and shaping their nations' shared strategic and economic destinies to meet the challenges of the 21st century including energy security, food security, infrastructure and connectivity.

* Available online (accessed 23 April 2014): <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2013-09-30/joint-communicu-president-republic-indonesia-and-prime-minister-australia-jakarta>

6. Both leaders were determined to encourage enterprises of the two countries to increase and expand two-way trade and investment flows to support economic growth and development in both countries.
7. The leaders looked forward to progressing negotiations on the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Partnership Agreement, including through the two pilot economic cooperation programs on agriculture and skills exchange, as identified by the Indonesia-Australia Business Partnership Group. They also agreed that all relevant Ministries would consult closely on approaches to encouraging greater investment between our two countries, including in agriculture, beef and cattle production.
8. Prime Minister Abbott and President Yudhoyono encouraged business in both countries to support infrastructure development in Indonesia, particularly projects within the framework of MP3EI. President Yudhoyono welcomed the high-level business delegation accompanying the Prime Minister as a clear signal of Australia's intent to boost business engagement with Indonesia.
9. Both leaders welcomed Australia's development program to enhance our partnership on Indonesia's development priorities such as social protection, education, infrastructure, sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction.
10. Both leaders welcomed the strengthened partnership in the fields of defence and security, including expanding cooperation within the framework of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement signed in September 2012. In particular, the two Leaders looked forward to continued close cooperation in natural disaster response, peacekeeping operations, cyber defence, maritime security, search and rescue and defence industry. Both Leaders also undertook to intensify police-to-police cooperation particularly in combating transnational crimes.

11. As co-chairs of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, both leaders committed to further strengthening Indonesia's and Australia's leadership of regional efforts to counter people smuggling and trafficking in persons. The leaders reaffirmed their adherence to the principle of shared responsibility in addressing in particular people smuggling and called for a more integrated and comprehensive approach, which covers prevention, early detection and protection as well as prosecution, involving countries of origin, transit and destination. To this end, both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to working closely in pushing forward the full and effective implementation of the Jakarta Declaration, the outcome of the Special Conference on Irregular Movement of Persons held in Jakarta on 20 August 2013, as an integral part of the Bali Process. Leaders agreed people smuggling was not a problem that could readily be resolved by one country alone and recommitted to working together to address the problem through bilateral and regional frameworks.
12. The two leaders committed to further strengthening bilateral consular cooperation to enable more effective delivery of consular services to their respective nationals. They underlined the importance of the annual bilateral consular consultations and agreed to deepen cooperation on crisis response planning and preparation.
13. The two leaders also emphasized the significant role of the Indonesia-Australia Dialogue in increasing people-to-people links and called for joint concrete measures to follow up the recommendations produced by the second Indonesia-Australia Dialogue held in Sydney, in March 2013. In order to enhance the Dialogue as a tool to promote greater business linkages, Leaders called for greater business involvement in the next Dialogue, currently scheduled to take place in late 2014.
14. President Yudhoyono welcomed Prime Minister Abbott's invitation for Indonesia to be one of the first destinations for young

Australians in the pilot implementation of the New Colombo Plan. This signature initiative would build deeper people-to-people links and allow Australia and Indonesia to approach our future engagement with optimism and confidence by encouraging the best and brightest young Australians to work and study in Indonesia. Leaders agreed that education, immigration, industry, employment and foreign ministries should work together to ensure smooth and early implementation of the programme. The two leaders welcomed the announcement of the establishment of an Australian Centre for Indonesian Studies, to be based at Monash University, to strengthen understanding of the Australia-Indonesia relationship.

15. Both leaders also agreed that as part of the efforts to promote interest in Indonesian language proficiency among young Australians, they would work with the private sector to develop internship programs.
16. Both leaders were encouraged by the intensifying Indonesia – Australia partnership in disaster rapid response within bilateral and multilateral frameworks such as the EAS and ARF. Both leaders also welcomed Indonesia-Australia co-chairmanship of the ARF workshop on consular responses to crises as a follow up to Indonesia-Australia’s EAS joint paper on disaster rapid response.
17. Prime Minister Abbott congratulated President Yudhoyono on Indonesia’s strong leadership and hosting of a successful and productive APEC year in 2013. Both leaders reiterated their commitment to pursuing complementary policy agendas across Indonesia’s APEC chairmanship in 2013 and Australian G20 presidency in 2014. The two leaders also emphasized the importance of realizing greater connectivity and strong, mutually beneficial and sustainable trade and investment cooperation among nations in the region and were determined to strengthen coordination and cooperation toward these goals.

[...]

‘Three Pillars of Jokowi’, Statement of Joko Widodo, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle Presidential Candidate*

Wassalamu’alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakaatuh. (May the peace and mercy of Allah be with you).

Heartfelt greetings to my fellow citizens that I am dearly proud of. With the support of the people, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle has gained the nation’s trust as the largest party chosen by Indonesian citizens.

As a leader, I will implement three aspects that will be my guidelines, namely sovereignty in politics, independence in economics, and distinctiveness in culture.

My task will be to ensure that the people of Indonesia will exercise the sovereignty in politics to prevent the imposition of other forces.

Our abundant wealth in natural resources will be the source of Indonesia’s economic independence.

Indonesia’s rich cultural diversity is a unique characteristic of other nations’ admiration.

Should I be elected, during my leadership, the cultural spectrum of this nation will be the distinct trait that will govern Indonesia’s international relationships.

I, a son and a proud citizen of Indonesia, am proud of all our strengths and weaknesses. Let us join to amplify our strengths and improve our weaknesses.

From us, for us and by all of us, the citizens of Indonesia. [...]

* Available online (accessed 14 May 2014):
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4C-u9v1sXg0>

‘Letter to the Editor: Prabowo Clarifies’, The Jakarta Post, 27 December 2013*

I am writing this response to the article entitled “Whatever happened in Kraras, Timor Leste, ‘Pak’ Prabowo?” written by Aboeprijadi Santoso, which appeared in the Dec. 20 edition of The Jakarta Post.

This essay, and specific charges relating to the tragic events at Kraras, is clearly a personal attack on my military career and personal reputation, based on unproven allegations, innuendos and third-hand reports — none substantiated, by either the United Nations or current Timor Leste authorities.

It is revealing that this issue, dealing with events that took place over 30 years ago, has been revived and finds its way into the press just 100 days before the coming Indonesian legislative election, in a manner clearly intended to cast serious doubt on me, as one of the leading candidates for the office of the president of the Republic of Indonesia.

I thus wish to protest in the strongest terms and to refute the scurrilous allegations, none of which are substantiated, contained in this article.

Let me ask you this. If indeed I am guilty of this massacre, and other such war crimes, how is it that I have been accepted and even photographed in meetings and friendly conversation with former Timor Leste president Xanana Gusmao (April 20, 2001), Lere Anan Timur (November 21, 2008) and Mari Alkatiri (June 20, 2013)?

Photographs and articles confirming this were published by the Post, which by the way should have done its homework before publishing Aboeprijadi’s article.

Would Xanana and other Timorese freedom fighters, our nation’s former

* Available online (accessed 14 May 2014):

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/27/letter-editor-prabowo-clarifies.html>

enemies, have befriended an Indonesian officer truly guilty of such despicable crimes against civilians?

For the record, I insist I was nowhere near the site of the “Kraras Massacre” that occurred in Viqueque district on Aug. 8, 1983 and I seriously challenge anyone to offer proof that I was either in the vicinity or that I issued any order to abuse or kill civilians.

Neither the UN nor the government of Timor Leste have ever proffered charges of human rights violations against me, and the article in question reveals this, with its “[...]all had heard of Prabowo, but none said to have seen him in the area [...]”, “allegedly involved in a number of human rights violations” and “the circumstances that led to renewed violence remain largely unclear”.

If the facts remain unclear, what is the point of bringing up this tragedy and pointing the finger at an Indonesian presidential candidate, except to undermine and cast a shadow on his electoral campaign?

In fact, my name was cleared in an investigative article by Jose Manuel Tesoro, carried in the March 13, 2000 edition of Asiaweek, which states the following:

“The question is: How far did Prabowo participate in all this? To obtain details of his alleged abuses, Asiaweek contacted four separate non-governmental organizations monitoring military atrocities. These were TAPOL in London; Solidamor in Jakarta; the HAK Foundation, headquartered in Dili; and the East Timor Action Network [ETAN] in New York. We asked for eyewitness reports, transcripts of intercepted communications, leaked papers or anything that could substantiate these stories. None could provide them.”

As a matter of fact, on many occasions I protected Falintil guerrillas taken prisoner by the Indonesian Military (TNI) and Timorese civilians from reprisals, in a complex and confused situation, where the Indonesian Army became involved in a civil conflict, one in which brother frequently stood against brother and the battle lines were unclear.

These tired and unproven rumors, as recited in this article (some three decades after the fact, conducted and written up by a journalist who apparently is well known for his grudges and animosity toward the TNI) are a matrix of lies, unsupported by history.

Ask the Timorese themselves what happened. I claim that this whispering campaign is most probably backed by an old guard of corrupt Indonesian politicians, frightened of a popular movement that appeals to the aspirations of millions of young people and the underprivileged poor, and which is determined to quash corruption and institute clean government.

The Great Indian Election

Amitabh Mattoo and Nirupama Subramanian*

India is in the midst of its quinquennial democratic exercise. The almost entirely peaceful and orderly change of government through a largely free and fair vote every five years in the world's second most populous country never ceases to amaze or cause wonderment. Observers did not give democracy much of a chance in a newly-independent India. The country's grinding poverty and the diversity of its ethnic, religious, caste and linguistic identities were thought to be insurmountable obstacles. Yet nearly seven decades later, flanked by unstable countries in its immediate neighbourhood, a system of parliamentary democracy thrives in India. Not only that, by as early as the 1970s it had taken root to the extent it was also able to resist an authoritarian leader's attempt to subvert it.

Elections 2014

The election for the 16th Lok Sabha (House of the People, the lower House of Parliament) began on April 7 and voting is being held on 10 dates across the country until May 12. The Lok Sabha has 543 seats that are filled by election, plus two seats to which representatives from the Anglo-Indian community are nominated by the President of India. The results will be announced on May 16.

India's Westminster-style parliament is elected by a first-past the post system in which the candidate with the most votes is declared the winner. Each constituency returns only one representative. Unlike in Australia, voting is not compulsory. Last year, the Supreme Court decreed the inclusion of the option 'None of the Above' in the ballot list to enable those who do not wish to choose any of the candidates in their constituency still to come out on voting day and exercise their franchise.

* Professor Amitabh Mattoo is the Director of the Australia India Institute and Professor of International Relations at the University of Melbourne. Ms Nirupama Subramanian is Associate Editor at *The Hindu*.

India has switched from the old style ballot paper to electronic voting machines: partially in 1999, and fully by the time of the next election in 2004. Though they are not entirely tamper-proof, these machines have cut down incidents of electoral fraud to a large extent.

The Election Commission of India, an autonomous statutory body with powers established by the Constitution, conducts the entire electoral exercise. The chief election commissioner can be removed only through impeachment by Parliament. The President of India has powers to sack the two other election commissioners. The Commission, once pliable by the government and perceived as partisan, began asserting itself as an impartial custodian of elections in the 1990s and has largely succeeded in ensuring that polls are free, fair and credible.

This time it is overseeing an election in which there are 815 million registered voters, of which over 100 million are new voters. The mindboggling logistics include the deployment of 11 million poll and security personnel at 830,000 polling stations.

What the Election Commission has not been able to do, despite its best efforts, is to enforce its limit on election expenses by parties and candidates. The ceiling for this election is Rs 7 million, but most candidates will have exceeded this many times over by the time the votes are counted. Surveys have shown how the wealthiest candidates win more elections than the poorest ones. Political parties have also resisted calls for more transparency in how they raise money.

The issue of criminality of candidates also dogs Indian elections. Last year, the Supreme Court ruled that a legislator would be disqualified from the House if convicted in a criminal case punishable with imprisonment of two years or more. The government tried to subvert the ruling through an ordinance that would allow convicted legislators to keep their seats if their appeal to a higher court was accepted within 90 days. But public outrage forced a hasty withdrawal of the ordinance. Still, it does not seem to have encouraged parties from selecting their candidates more carefully; a recent survey by the Association of Democratic Reforms and National Election

Watch revealed that one out of every three candidates fielded by the two major national parties in this election, the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Congress, have criminal charges pending against them.

Parties, Candidates and Issues

The main parties fighting for power in this election are the Congress and its allies under the banner of United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies, known as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). In addition, there are a host of regional and other smaller parties in the fray.

The UPA has come into this election as an underdog. After 10 years or two terms as the ruling party, it is suffering severely from the effects of incumbency. In its second term, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Government has been seen as corrupt, effete, lacking direction or purpose, and because of the scandals that surrounded it, unable to fulfil its policy objectives, either domestic or foreign. Prime Minister Singh, who is not contesting the election (he is a member of the Rajya Sabha, the Upper House) has said he will not accept a third term in office. The Congress, which leads the alliance, has not officially named an alternative, but it is widely presumed to be Rahul Gandhi, scion of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty that leads the Congress. The 42-year-old Gandhi is the leader of his party's campaign. Congress' added disadvantage is that its presumed prime ministerial candidate is seen as lacking in vision, articulation and, indeed, experience in any position of responsibility in government.

On the other side stands the NDA, which is promising a strong, purposeful, dynamic government that will take the country's economic growth to what it was and higher. The BJP's prime ministerial candidate is the long-standing Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi, who is credited with the economic transformation of that state and has the support of much of corporate India. But his anointment came after months of internal struggle in the party. Some leaders in the party are uncomfortable with his reputation as a chief minister who did little to prevent riots in his state in 2002 in which more than 1000 people, mainly Muslims, were killed. But this dissension died as it became apparent that the BJP's powerful

ideological group, the Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh, was on Modi's side. The RSS spearheads the idea of political Hinduism and Hindu nationalism, also known as Hindutva. Modi did not have any criminal charges laid against him for the riots but critics have argued that he should have taken moral and political responsibility for the violence.

The Congress has projected this election as a battle for "the idea of India", in which its own ideology and vision of a secular India is pitted against what it describes as BJP's "divisive" politics. The BJP, on the other hand, has been playing down its ideological underpinnings and focusing its campaign on its "development agenda". In his speeches, Modi has been promising to replicate what has now come to be known as the "Gujarat model" of economic development. The state is one of the few in India that the country's industrial sector likes to do business with because of quick clearances and permissions for land acquisition, the absence of red tape and its image as a State where politicians and officials do not demand bribes at every step of the way. It is also one of the few states that has managed an uninterrupted power supply. But the model is contested by Modi's critics on the grounds that while it may have enriched the rich, it has not done much for the state's poor.

The UPA government has enacted a raft of legislation to help the country's poor: laws that guarantee 100 days employment in rural India, the right to food, the right to information and the right to education. It has also launched several other social welfare measures. But the atmosphere against it seems to have turned so decisively that it has not been able to project these as achievements.

At the moment, the prospects do not look bright for a Third Front led by the Communist Party of India Marxist and other left parties; many smaller and regional parties that this group tried to woo have prefer to keep their options open and wait for the results of the election before making a decision on their support. For regional politicians, the biggest incentive to join a coalition is the opportunity to be part of the ruling alliance. The best time for that is after the results are announced, when the group with the largest number of seats is looking for more allies to bring up its total in the

house to the magic number of 273. This is the time when small parties have the opportunity to drive big bargains.

Since 1998 national parties have not managed on their own to get the 51 per cent of seats required for government formation. If that trend continues in this election, in the eventuality of the NDA emerging as the single largest combine but still falling short of the halfway mark in the Lok Sabha, it will need to reach out to other parties.

Regional satraps in Tamil Nadu (Jayalalitha and M. Karunanidhi), Bihar (Nitish Kumar), Uttar Pradesh (Mayawati and Mulayam Singh Yadav) and West Bengal (Mamata Banerjee) all hope to be kingmakers. In such a scenario, there is a possibility that Modi's controversial past could become an obstacle to post-election coalition-building for the NDA.

Indian voters had got used to being ruled by the same broad mix of national and regional parties. But late last year, to the shock of India's political class and voters, a rookie entered the race for the Delhi state elections and romped away with a good number of seats, enough for it to form a minority government, even though that proved short-lived.

The surprising success of the Aam Admi Party (AAP), or the Common Man's Party, led the party to field candidates countrywide for the parliamentary elections. A broad swathe of the urban middle classes believe in the party and the potential that it holds for a new kind of politics. AAP says it has no ideology and that what it stands for is good, corruption-free governance. The party grew out of a massive anti-corruption movement in 2011 in the aftermath of a number of corruption scandals that tumbled out of the government's cupboard. Its leader Arvind Kejriwal is a former civil servant who worked in the Income Tax department. Unlike other parties, AAP's fund-raising is done in a transparent way with every donation recorded and open to public scrutiny.

Despite its traction and the appeal it holds for large sections in some cities, AAP's ability to replicate the Delhi model across 543 seats is doubtful. But even a single digit tally in parliament would be a huge achievement for this dark horse. Congress hopes that AAP will split the anti-Congress vote to

the BJP's detriment. Kejriwal is taking on Modi in a direct fight in Varanasi constituency in Uttar Pradesh. In the Indian system, a candidate can contest more than one constituency; usually politicians who do this choose one safe seat. A candidate who wins in more than one constituency can keep only one with by-elections held at a later date in the other seat/s.

Modi's safe seat is in his home state of Gujarat. By contesting in Uttar Pradesh, Modi evidently hopes to rebut criticism of him as a provincial leader; winning in the Hindi heartland would be a ringing endorsement of his credentials as a pan-India leader. Losing to a perceived lightweight like Kejriwal, on the other hand, would be akin to a national humiliation.

Opinion polls have predicted that NDA will be able to gather enough numbers to form government. However there have been occasions in India's electoral history when psephologists' predictions have gone terribly wrong, most notably in 2004 when the NDA was expected to return to power on the strength of its "India Shining" campaign but instead saw the return of the Congress for the next 10 years.

After the Results

Irrespective of which party or group forms the next government, the challenges facing it are formidable. India is the youngest country in the world. More than half its 1.3 billion population is under the age of 25 and has global aspirations. It is also a country with a fast expanding aspirational middle class, which in a few years could number more than 500 million people.

Yet India still has one of the largest numbers of people living below the poverty line, globally determined as those who live on less than \$1.25 per day. More than half India's population owns mobile phones, but half the population does not have access to toilets. Quality school and college education is hard to get, even in premium private institutes in the cities. Rural schools lack infrastructure and suffer from teacher absenteeism and high drop-out rates. India has high rates of infant, child and maternal mortality. Malnutrition rates are among the highest in the world. In a deeply patriarchal society, sections of women do not have the ability to

fulfil their social, political, economic and intellectual potential. India's sex ratio (the number of women to every 1000 men) is, along with China, the worst in the world. Female foeticide and sex selection continue to be widely practised despite being outlawed. The practice has nothing to do with poverty - the worst offenders are the wealthiest states in India. Meanwhile, India's economic growth has fallen to below 5 per cent and job creation has ground to a halt.

Foreign policy does not figure high on the list of priorities during an election, but this is an area that will need the immediate attention of the next government. Relations with the United States, which underwent a strategic shift with the signing of the civilian nuclear accord, have stagnated. Relations with China, with which India has a border dispute, are at an impasse. So too are relations with Pakistan, which have never really made progress after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. As for the rest of the South Asian neighbourhood, India is viewed with suspicion and distrust more so now than even five years ago.

The challenges before the new government are thus formidable, both internally and externally. Domestically, managing the expectations of an increasingly impatient electorate will be no easy task for even the most astute government. Internationally, the new government faces an international system that is more divided than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Will India, as often in the past, muddle through these challenges without firm direction? Or will it descend into its most serious crises in its history as a modern independent nation? Or will it, for a change, navigate through these problems with clarity of purpose and direction? By early June, we should get the first signals of how India will cope with the next five years.

India's Foreign Policy after the Elections

Rajiv Bhatia*

Even before they began on 7 April, elections to the 16th Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament, became a landmark in the history of democratic elections in the world. Simply put, it is the largest event of its kind in human history. This time 815 million people are eligible to vote within the boundaries of a single country, a number that exceeds the combined electorate of the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia and Bangladesh. If the turnout is 65%, nearly 530 million people would have actually voted. And they would do so on well over a million electronic voting machines!

Foreign policy does not figure among the key issues on which the election is being fought: these largely centre on the economy, governance, political ideologies and local issues. According to a recent opinion survey, people's three topmost concerns are: "Better job opportunities", "Drinking water" and "Better roads".¹ Nevertheless, India has its own expanding worldview. Indians have become increasingly conscious of the impact of globalisation, technology and interdependence on inter-state relations. They also realise the inter-linkage between their goal of security and prosperity at home and global developments. Therefore, the country's strategic community and other groupings have been engaged in debating the kind of foreign policy India may favour in the future. For example, the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), a prestigious foreign policy think-tank, recently hosted a well-attended seminar on this topical theme.

Possible Scenarios

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India has been ruled by coalition governments since 1989. This may not change in coming years. An objective analysis would indicate that the elections will result in one of the three outcomes: 1) A coalition led by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), with Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as its principal constituent; 2) A coalition led by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) with Indian National Congress (INC) as its principal constituent; 3) A coalition composed of several regional parties, which is supported externally by one of the two national parties. It may be useful to reflect on possible contours of foreign policy in these different eventualities.

During the Cold War period India followed a policy anchored on Non-Alignment; it introduced several adaptations and shifts during the post-Cold War period. Under the NDA government (1999-2004) and the two UPA governments (2004-2014), foreign policy evolved further, becoming increasingly pragmatic, realistic and focused on economic development. It was marked by a broad national consensus, even though opposition parties could always find enough in the policies of the government of the day to oppose and criticise. However, in the past three years several aspects of foreign policy have come under severe criticism, especially management of relations with the United States, China, Pakistan and India's South Asian neighbours.² This is the backdrop to address the question: what broadly will be India's external policy in the next five years?

BJP as Driver

In case an NDA government is formed under BJP's prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi, the legacy of the previous NDA government under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee is expected to be an important, though not exclusive, factor. Mr Modi's own thinking, record as the chief minister of Gujarat since 2001 and experience in dealing with foreign governments will be a major determinant, as will the BJP's party manifesto.³ Finally, the complexion of the foreign policy and national security team and, in particular, the views of the national security adviser, foreign minister and defence minister, will also need to be factored in. This is an unknown factor at present.

Considering that Mr Modi has placed a special focus on his economic development agenda, projecting Gujarat as the model, there is widespread expectation that a policy framework to accelerate reform and economic growth will be adopted. This indicates that the country may exert itself even more (than before) to forge foreign investment, trade and technology linkages. Special attention may be paid to relations with western countries (including Japan) as well as to economic diplomacy. The relationship with the United States will assume considerably more significance, for at least two reasons: first, Mr Modi was denied a US visa for his perceived role in communal violence in 2002, but this presumably would change; second, India-US relations, after the heady days of 2008 under the Bush Administration which lasted until the exciting visit of President Obama to India in 2010, seem to have reached a 'plateau.' As an Indian analyst argued recently, "Broadly, progress has been below par on all key initiatives".⁴ The chapter that began with the arrest of an Indian diplomat in New York in December 2013 and (hopefully) ended with the resignation of the US ambassador in India in April 2014, would need to be closed definitively, and a forward-looking approach adopted in mutual interest.⁵ Sustained endeavours would be needed, both in New Delhi and Washington, to restore energy and dynamism to a relationship that has larger geopolitical salience for the world. According to columnist Sanjaya Baru, "Modi represents a brand of Asian nationalism kindled by China's rise and the West's part-confused, part-duplicious response".⁶ Modi may accord priority to economic imperatives in his foreign policy and also to strengthening "the relationship between defence and diplomacy".⁷

On relations with China, a country which received Mr Modi with some fanfare, progress could be expected, especially because President Xi Jinping has already announced that he is keen to visit India later in the year. Mr Modi can be expected to calibrate the need to expand political and economic cooperation as well as the imperative to assert India's will to defend its fundamental interests. Addressing an election meeting in Arunachal Pradesh, he advised China to shed its "expansionist mindset" and "forge bilateral ties with India for peace, progress and prosperity of both the nations".⁸ This point went down well within India and caused few ripples in China.

On Pakistan, scholars seem divided whether a Modi government would follow the Vajpayee line or a different approach, and how different it would be from the policy approach of its predecessor. Much will naturally depend on how Pakistan responds to India's new leader. Interestingly, a well-known Pakistani journalist opined, "What is clear is that Pakistanis will continue to distrust Mr Modi, no matter what".⁹ Concerning relations with other neighbours such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, a BJP Government may too come under pressure from its allies. As columnist C. Raja Mohan has advised, it may need to learn a thing or two from the astute manner in which the Vajpayee government addressed such matters.

A brief analysis of BJP's manifesto is also useful. The party lays much emphasis on national (both internal and external) security. It plans to study India's nuclear doctrine (including 'No First Use' commitment) and revise and update it "to make it relevant to challenges of current times". It is committed to maintaining a credible minimum deterrent "that is in tune with changing geostatic realities". On foreign policy, BJP's vision is "to fundamentally reboot and reorient... the goals, content and process", locating "India's global strategic engagement in a new paradigm and on a wider canvas". The party will be driven by its basic conviction that "a resurgent India must get its rightful place in the comity of nations and international institutions". It also believes that political stability, progress and peace in the region are "essential" for South Asia's growth and development.¹⁰

Congress as Driver

In the case that Congress gets yet another opportunity to form a coalition government, this will enable the party to elevate its vice president Rahul Gandhi to prime minister of India. A Gandhi government can be expected to be guided by the legacy of previous Congress governments, especially those of Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh. While addressing a conference of Indian ambassadors in November 2013, the outgoing prime minister delineated the five core elements of foreign policy as below:¹¹

- India's relations with world are increasingly defined by its development priorities;
- Greater integration with world economy will benefit India;
- India seeks stable, long-term and mutually beneficial relations with all major powers, and is ready to create global economic and security environment that is beneficial to all nations;
- The Indian subcontinent's shared destiny requires greater regional cooperation and connectivity;
- Foreign policy is not defined merely by India's interests, but also by the values dear to its people.

The party's 2014 manifesto contains a short section on its thinking and goals regarding external relations. It speaks of the Congress's commitment to "the articulation and implementation of a robust and dynamic foreign policy". Under a Congress government, India would build "peaceful, stable and mutually beneficial relations with all major powers and all our Asian neighbours". Reference is made to combatting global terrorism, India's quest for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council and the country's role "as a critical bridge between the developed and the developing world". Strengthening the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to help it to realise a "South Asian economic community" and managing relations with China, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are identified as other priorities. On Afghanistan, the manifesto expresses the party's conviction that "the real threat is not within but from terrorism from beyond its borders". A Congress government will support the peace process if it remains "Afghan owned and Afghan driven". In a nod to the domestic constituency, the document stresses that protecting Indians overseas from exploitation or threat would remain "a permanent concern".¹²

Regional Parties as Drivers

Opinion polls and experts have been predicting that the two major national parties between themselves may garner only half or a little over half of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha. The other half may be won by an array of smaller national and regional parties. This explains their clout and ability to influence the formation of the next government as well as the formulation

of its policies. However at this stage it is very difficult to visualise how this ‘third option’ may play out and, more precisely, how it may impact on the nation’s foreign policy.

All that is known is that the incumbent chief ministers of West Bengal and Tamil Nadu played a crucial role in influencing India's Bangladesh and Sri Lanka policies respectively in recent years. Inclusion of their parties in a future government under the “third option” or as coalition partners with BJP or Congress is likely to mould India's neighbourhood policy to some extent. This aside, regional parties are not much interested in foreign policy issues.

A brief mention of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) should be made here, which has been described as “small, young, idealistic, hotheaded and underfunded, with its platform still evolving”.¹³ But to claim that AAP has “the two big parties running scared” is an exaggeration. Significantly though, AAP’s manifesto has a section on national security and foreign policy.¹⁴

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis suggests that in case the second or third scenario materialises, there may be very little change in India’s foreign policy. If the first scenario manifests there may not be radical shifts or drastic changes but “foreign policy priorities and response mechanism vis-a-vis foreign policy” might change, to quote Seshadri Chari, convenor of the BJP’s foreign affairs cell.¹⁵

On any scenario, the “Look East Policy” is likely to continue as enjoying strong bipartisan support. The next government is expected to nurture and deepen the policy, with relations with ASEAN as well as other key players such as China, Japan, Vietnam and Australia likely to receive heightened attention. Australia, in particular, has invested heavily in political, economic and Track II diplomacy with India in the past three years. Australia’s economic achievements, its geopolitical sensibilities and its responsibilities as chair of G20 and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) create conducive conditions for closer understanding and cooperation with

India. An early opportunity of interaction at the highest political levels should be seized.

Contrary to Robert Kaplan's views, India does not suffer from a leadership vacuum.¹⁶ Never before have Indian voters been as demanding as they are today; never before has the Indian media been as critical in its scrutiny of leaders as now; and never before have 100 million new voters been added to the electorate as is the case for this election. From this intensely competitive electoral process will emerge a group of leaders who will bear the weighty responsibility of leading 1.2 billion people. Their capabilities and commitment should not be underestimated.

India needs a stable government, decisive and inclusive leadership, broad policy consensus, working cooperation between the government and opposition and a new compact between the rulers and the ruled. Contours of the next government's policy framework, covering both internal and external domains, will start to become clearer from 16 May onwards. The world will be watching the unfolding phenomenon with deep interest.

¹ The survey was conducted by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) and Daksh. *The Times of India*, 3 April 2014.

² Please see Vivek Katju, "Without a strategic compass", *The Indian Express*, 2 April 2014.

³ Deepak Parekh, "A Blueprint For Governance", *The Times of India*, 10 April 2014. The author, explaining the value of party manifestos states: "Manifestos are only statements of intent, but they reveal the basic line of thought within a party."

⁴ Pranab Dhal Samanta, "How the relationship soured", *The Indian Express*, 2 April 2014.

⁵ Ashley J. Tellis, "Getting India-US Ties Back on Track", *India Today*, 21 April 2014. The author argues that, if gaps and deficits between the two countries are filled and "India's return to economic success assured, there is enough to sustain a fruitful engagement that serves mutual interests for a long time to come."

⁶ Sanjaya Baru, "The world of Narendra Abe", *The Indian Express*, 27 February 2014.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ "China should shed expansionist mindset: Modi", *The Hindu*, 22 February 2014. < <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-should-shed-expansionist-mindset-modi/article5716591.ece> > (accessed on 7 April 2014).

⁹ Huma Yusuf, "Bumps ahead on Indo-Pak road", *The Asian Age*, 2 April 2014.

¹⁰ C. Raja Mohan, "Modi's world", *The Indian Express*, 9 April 2014. The author argues that the BJP manifesto is "a classic committee document...", but "its vagueness should offer Modi...considerable freedom to put his own stamp on India's foreign policy."

¹¹ "Highlights of Prime Minister's address at the Annual Conclave of Indian Ambassadors/High Commissioners abroad in New Delhi", Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 4 November 2014 < <http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches->

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ave+of+Indian+AmbassadorsHigh+Commissioners+abroad+in+New+Delhi> (accessed on 7
April 2014).

¹² “Lok Sabha Elections 2014, Manifesto, Indian National Congress”,
<<http://inc.in/images/Pages/English%20Manifesto%20for%20Web.pdf>> (accessed on 3
April 2014).

¹³ “Preparing for opposition”, *The Economist*, 22 February 2014.

¹⁴ “Aam Aadmi Party, National Manifesto – 2014” <
<https://app.box.com/s/q9k6f7e21265olkpxrzq>> (accessed on 6 April 2014).

¹⁵ Parul Chandra, “BJP govt may take hard Pak line”, *The Asian Age*, 3 April 2014.

¹⁶ Robert D. Kaplan and Michael Nayebi-Oskoui, “India's Tryst With Destiny”, 10
September 2013. <[http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/10/09/indias-tryst-with-
destiny](http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/10/09/indias-tryst-with-destiny)> (accessed on 31 March 2014).

Indonesia's Legislative Elections: The Importance of Money and Personalities

Greg Fealy*

The April parliamentary elections in Indonesia have attracted surprisingly little Australian media coverage, having been over-shadowed by the upcoming presidential elections in July. But last month's elections are significant for what they reveal about the direction of Indonesian politics and the factors which most influence voter choices. Vote-buying and leadership, rather than policies and party identification, were key factors in determining the outcome. The election results will also bear heavily upon the presidential election and the process of forming the next government. The race for the presidency is somewhat more open than seemed likely a few months ago, largely because the party nominating the front-running candidate, Jakarta governor Joko Widodo (or 'Jokowi' as he is popularly known), did less well than expected and will probably require a larger number of coalition partners to ensure success.

The Election Process

The 9 April general election was the eleventh in Indonesia's post-independence history and the fourth since the 1998 downfall of Soeharto's regime ushered in a new period of democratisation. The scale and logistical challenges of the election were massive. About 187 million citizens registered to vote in more than 600,000 polling stations across the nation's many thousands of islands. Four simultaneous elections were conducted: for the national parliament (DPR), the largely impotent Regional Representatives Council (DPD) and for both the provincial and district legislatures (DPRD). Twelve parties competed for DPR and DPRD seats; DPD candidates were not allowed a party affiliation. To secure seats in the DPR, parties have to gain at least 3.5% of the national vote. For this

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election an open-list proportional system was used in which voters could either pierce a party logo at the top of the ballot paper or the name of an individual candidate listed below, or both. The country is divided into 80 electoral districts that return a total of 560 DPR members, 132 DPD members (four per province) and almost 19,000 DPRD members. A seven-person Election Commission manages all aspects of the election process.

The election itself passed without any major violence or disruption, as has been the case with all four post-Suharto elections. The Election Commission is not scheduled to release the official results before 9 May, but numerous survey companies and research institutions delivered reasonably accurate 'quick count' tallies within a few hours of the closing of polling stations. The various quick count results were largely consistent with each other.

Provisional Results

Of the 12 parties in the election, ten have cleared the 3.5% DPR threshold. They are, in order of their average quick count result:

1. Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) – 19%
2. Golkar – 15%
3. Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) – 12%
4. Democrat Party (PD) – 9%
5. National Awakening Party (PKB) – 9%
6. National Mandate Party (PAN) – 7%
7. Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) – 7%
8. National Democratic Party (NasDem) – 6%
9. United Development Party (PPP) - 6%
10. People's Conscience Party (Hanura) – 5%

The biggest surprise of the election was the poorer than expected performance of former president Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDIP. The party had nominated Jokowi, for president just before the start of the campaign and, given that he is by far the most popular politician in the country, there was much speculation that this would further boost PDIP's already rising stocks. Many polls and pundits had forecast that PDIP's vote would exceed

25%, giving it a substantial lead over other parties and a clear advantage in any future coalition negotiations. But with only a modest lead over Golkar and Gerindra, PDIP was denied a commanding position.

A number of factors were at work in PDIP's disappointing showing. The most obvious was the failure of the party to use its most potent electoral asset – Jokowi – to good effect. PDIP advertising for much of the campaign featured Megawati's daughter, Puan Maharani, who has low public standing. This strategic blunder was directed by Puan herself, as she was miffed at her mother's nomination of Jokowi prior to the election and used her position as chair of the campaign committee to insist on her own prominence in the advertisements. After the election, Puan's role was strongly criticised within the party, by commentators and Jokowi's supporters. Megawati herself was not especially active during the election and Jokowi's own campaigning was limited by his continuing gubernatorial responsibilities in Jakarta.

PDIP's failure to gain above 20% of the vote has direct consequences for the 9 July presidential election and the cabinet formation that will be finalised in October. The threshold for nominating a presidential candidate is 20% of the seats in the new national parliament or 25% of the national vote. As PDIP will fall short of the threshold it will need the support of one or more other parties formally to nominate Jokowi and his running mate.

The Decline of SBY's Democrats

Less surprising in this election was the sharp fall in the vote for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY) Democrat Party. PD was the largest party in 2009 with 21% of the vote and in 2012 its popularity was in the mid-20% range according to many polls, due in large part to the president's own high approval ratings. But the last two years have been calamitous for PD. A succession of corruption scandals have seen numerous senior figures forced to resign from their positions, including Party Chairman Anas Urbaningrum, Youth and Sports Minister Andi Mallarangeng, PD Treasurer Muhammad Nazaruddin and former beauty queen and parliamentarian Angelina Sondakh. SBY's own son, Edhie Baskoro, who is PD Secretary-General, has also been repeatedly accused of graft, which he

denies; no charges have been laid against him. One consequence of the corruption cases has been to expose rifts within PD, particularly between those leaders loyal to SBY and those siding with Anas.

SBY's own standing has fallen as his party's woes have deepened. Not only is he seen as an increasingly ineffectual president, he is also viewed as failing to keep order within his party. SBY had hoped that PD would continue as a leading party beyond his presidency and would serve as an electoral vehicle for his family. His brother-in-law is one of 11 candidates for the PD presidential nomination and his older son, Agus Harimurti, currently a military officer, is said to harbour high political ambitions. But it will be difficult to rebuild PD, especially once SBY has left office and the party's longer-term prospects are dim.

A More Even Spread and More Money Politics

One of the notable features of this election was the relative evenness of the votes between parties compared to previous elections. In 1999, the top three parties won more than 68% of the vote and the leading party gained 35%; this year the top-three figure was 45% and the highest ranked party got below 20%. This has meant that the number of parties getting between 5-15% has increased from three in 1999 to nine in 2014. One practical outcome from this more even spread of votes is that governing coalitions need to include more parties to ensure a healthy parliamentary majority. The downside is that the more diverse the coalition membership, the less discipline and coherence the government is likely to have.

There are several reasons for this drop in support for major parties. To begin with, voter volatility has increased and loyalty to parties has fallen sharply over the past 15 years. In 1999, survey data suggested that more than 80% of voters strongly identified with a particular party; in 2014 this figure was down below 20%. Polls also show that voters are increasingly 'rational' in their choices, meaning that they feel less tied to a group identity or ideology and are more concerned with the competence and leadership qualities of candidates rather than the parties that support them. The change to an open list proportional electoral system in 2009 has also seriously undermined the position of parties. This system allows voters to

choose individual candidates, rather than a party, and provisional results suggest about 60% of ballot papers were marked for candidates and only 40% for parties. Importantly, candidates from the same party are now competing against each other as much as against candidates from other parties. Local campaigns are now candidate-centred rather than party-run. In short, Indonesian politics is increasingly driven by personalities than by party machines.

The open proportional system has had another major impact on Indonesian politics: it has generated unprecedented monetisation of elections. Candidates usually need vast sums of money to have a chance of success. They have to pay to secure their candidature and a good position on their party candidate list and they then need to fund their on-the-ground campaigns, which includes bankrolling large numbers of ‘field coordinators’ and campaign workers to distribute materials, gather constituent data and buy votes. For those who are elected, an early priority in the legislature is to recoup their costs and repay debts. Researchers regard the level of money politics in the 2014 election as unprecedented and that vote-buying was a major factor in deciding elector behaviour.

Resilient Political Islam

Another unexpected outcome of the election was the stronger than predicted performance of Islamic parties. In the previous election, the total vote for Islamic parties was 29%, the lowest in Indonesia’s history. Opinion polls in the run up to this year’s election consistently showed them headed for an even worse result of less than 25%. But the quick count tallies revealed an Islamic vote of around 31% (still relatively small given that 87% of the population profess Islam as their religion). The good showing for these parties was not an indicator of growing voter appetite for religious ideology, as none of the four Islamic parties which cleared the parliamentary threshold campaigned on Islamist issues, such as implementation of sharia law or constitutional recognition of Islam. Indeed, all four parties made broad appeals to the electorate and emphasised inclusive, nationalistic messages.

The main reason for Islamic parties' electoral resilience was that their campaign strategies aimed at appealing to the interests of core constituencies. For example, PKB and PPP, which both draw most of their votes from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest Muslim organisation, targeted Islamic scholars and schools, either channelling considerable financial resources to them or promising to do so if elected. In the past, a majority of NU members had voted for non-Islamic parties and candidates and PKB and PPP were determined to win back some of these voters. This strategy was especially successful in the case of PKB, which doubled its vote, primarily because it was seen as closer to NU than in the previous two elections. PAN pursued a similar, though less overt, strategy with Muhammadiyah, Indonesia's second-largest Muslim organisation.

Perhaps the most interesting result of any Islamic party was that of PKS, which had been widely expected to suffer a sharp drop in its vote. The party had been beset by corruption scandals for much of the past two years and its former president had been jailed for 16 years at the start of 2014 for graft. PKS is the most ideologically-oriented and moralistic of the Islamic parties and it had previously achieved success by describing itself as 'clean and caring'. Despite the scandals, PKS' vote dropped by just 1% from the 8% it gained in 2009, indicating the solidity of its support base and its highly effective grassroots campaigning.

The Presidential Elections and Relations with Australia

The legislative elections have made the presidential election a little less predictable than many pundits were expecting. Jokowi would appear to have an almost unassailable lead in the polls over his nearest rival, Prabowo Subianto from Gerindra, and several respected survey institutes are predicting that he will win in the first round of voting to be held on 9 July (a run-off round will be conducted on 9 September if no candidate wins a majority). But PDIP's disappointing performance on 9 April has complicated Jokowi's preparations. Prospective coalition partners now feel that they can make stronger demands in return for their support. Jokowi has made clear his dislike of political horse-trading and he would prefer to limit the number of party representatives in his cabinet in order to appoint more

professionals as ministers. There are also tensions between his close supporters and sections of PDIP over who should direct the presidential campaign and have the final decision on cabinet positions. These problems should be manageable as Jokowi is an astute politician and PDIP has no wish to jeopardise its chances of being the pivotal party in a future government.

Australia, like many other neighbouring countries, has followed the political developments in Indonesia closely. After a decade of statesman-like leadership from SBY, there is some anxiety that the next president will be less well disposed towards Australia than the current incumbent. The clear preference of Australian officials is for Jokowi rather than Prabowo. Although Prabowo has made a concerted effort to persuade foreign governments that he would be a responsible and cooperative head of state, his lamentable human rights record and combustible temperament make him a risky presidential prospect for Australia. Jokowi has little experience in international affairs and is more overtly nationalistic on economic issues than SBY. But he is also pragmatic and quick to learn and would likely prove an amenable president on regional issues, particularly if he had an experienced and moderate foreign minister to guide him. If Jokowi is elected president later this year, the Abbott Government will be relieved, but it may well still find the new Indonesian Government less forgiving of any Australian missteps than its predecessor has been.

Implications of the Elections for Australia-Indonesia Relations and Indonesia's Place in the World

Natalie Sambhi*

After a decade of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY) presidency, Indonesia's elections have brought equal parts excitement and apprehension about the country's political future. Under SBY, Indonesia has sought to reaffirm its role as a regional power within the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and develop its image as an activist global player. But it is less certain in which direction the country will head under a new president. Given Indonesia's increased clout, by virtue of its population size, geostrategic significance, economic performance and character as a democratic, Muslim majority state, it is important Indonesia remains engaged in both regional and international affairs. Closer to home, Australia will be watching closely to see whether a president will emerge who is as pro-Western and supportive of bilateral ties with Australia as SBY has been. It is uncertain as to whether the current administration's active diplomatic footprint will continue under a new one.

Part of this uncertainty results from the fact that the leading presidential candidate, Joko Widodo, has not yet outlined a clear vision for the country. Jokowi (as he is generally known) is popular among Indonesians due to his image as a grassroots reformer and whose background as a self-made entrepreneur stands him in stark contrast with traditional political elites. Despite a favourable track record as mayor of Solo and governor of Jakarta, Jokowi also has little experience working at the national level. His focus has been domestic issues, particularly those which concern poorer classes of Indonesians. Popularity is no substitute, however, for stewardship of a country of increasing regional and international importance.

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Australian policymakers will be interested in watching how Indonesian foreign and defence policy unfolds under a Jokowi presidency. Given Jokowi's inexperience, the appointment of sensible and competent ministers will play a role in shaping Indonesia's outlook on world affairs. In particular, an experienced vice president will be important in ensuring Indonesia remains engaged in regional and international issues. There's been some talk of former Vice President Jusuf Kalla as a potential running mate with Jokowi. Kalla's proven credentials in conflict resolution would be of value: he helped solve inter-religious violence in Sulawesi in 2001 and steered Aceh's rehabilitation after the 2004 tsunami. Of all potential Vice-Presidential candidates, Kalla can best ease Jokowi into the realm of international politics, but, at time of writing, no such announcements have been made.

The next most popular presidential candidate, former Kopassus commander Prabowo Subianto, provides no more certainty about Indonesia's future foreign policy trajectory. In contrast to Jokowi, Prabowo has provided a tentative outline of his vision for Indonesia containing strong nationalistic tendencies. While Jokowi remains in the lead, it is worth noting that there will be a different set of foreign policy challenges should Prabowo come to power.

In either case, Indonesia's reputation as a regional power and activist global player will make it easier for a new administration. Key concepts such as 'non-alignment' and 'free and active' have long shaped Indonesian foreign policy and provide the framework for future leaders. The challenge for any future administration will be maintaining the diplomatic footprint of the previous government under President Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa.

Natalegawa has been an influential and vocal figure in the projecting Indonesian foreign policy ideals. In recent years, Natalegawa's activism has manifested in a number of ways, bringing prominence and gravitas to the perception of Indonesia as the de facto head of ASEAN. Indonesia's role as an active regional power is reflected in Natalegawa's proposal for a treaty of amity of cooperation across the Indo-Pacific to provide a

framework for consultation and communication in order to contain regional conflict.

Likewise President Yudhoyono has shown a strong, personal interest in the foreign policy realm, promoting Indonesia as a 'regional power, global player' in many of his speeches and being engaged in initiatives such as the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals, climate change and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

At present, it is hard to see any of the presidential candidates being as enthusiastic about Indonesia's foreign policy agenda as the current combination of president and foreign minister. Given Indonesia's internal challenges and the focus of current presidential candidates, it is likely that domestic politics will dominate. For Australia, this could be problematic.

It has been a tumultuous eight months in the Australia-Indonesia relationship, despite an overall strengthening of ties over the last decade under SBY. The Coalition Government's asylum seeker policy coupled with revelations of spying on the Indonesian president has caused diplomatic tension. At the lowest point, President Yudhoyono recalled Indonesia's Ambassador to Australia and suspended some areas of defence and security cooperation. Since then, Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop has been working together with her Indonesian counterpart to develop a Code of Conduct to help set bilateral ties back on track. There have been some signs of progress with the recent announcement that Indonesian Ambassador Najib Riphath Kesoema will return to Australia within the month.¹ However there are no guarantees that the character of the next administration will be as pro-Australian. If there is an absence of diplomatic goodwill towards Australia, both sides will have to rely on promoting shared interests and the merits of practical cooperation.

Indonesia will continue to play a role in regional and international affairs: its size, geography, economy and character as a democratic, Muslim majority state alone dictate this. Its history as a non-aligned state and UN member will also help shape its foreign policy in future. The extent to which Indonesia chooses to exercise its influence will be a key question the next administration will have to answer.

¹ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-10/indonesia-to-send-ambassador-back-to-canberra/5443970>

Biographies of Contributors

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Rajiv Bhatia was appointed Director General of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) in June 2012. Previously, as a career diplomat, he served India with distinction for more than thirty-seven years. He served as India's ambassador/high commissioner in Kenya, Myanmar, Mexico and South Africa. Presently, he is a member of the Academic Council of Jawaharlal Nehru University, member of the governing council of the National Institute of Design and member-secretary of the governing council of ICWA. Known for his intellectual inclinations, Ambassador Bhatia enjoys writing and speaking on a wide range of foreign policy related

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