A Lehman-style financial crisis in China is probably inevitable within the next two to three years. Yet despite what will be a bumpy transition, the country should then resume respectable — though slower than current — growth.

While the Russia-China has developed beyond an “axis of convenience,” it is not an alliance. The result is that China will hold the key to moderating Russian behaviour in the future, and that the Chinese and Russian interests will not always align.

Both Boris Johnson, the mercurial and ego-driven new British prime minister, and the present elected EU leaders — Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel, Donald Tusk and Jean Claude Junker — must share the blame for splitting the world’s largest and most secure economic bloc.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison has been touched by Forrest Gump magic. His “Pacific family” policy label has already delivered wins that are as surprising as they are promising.  

Forty years since five departments were consolidated to create the Department of Defence, it is now celebrated and divisive politics are long-forgotten. The creation of Home Affairs should too enable a more strategic and integrated approach to public policy.

As an instance of cultural and public diplomacy, the ballet Red Detachment of Women was a “win” for China in its objective of exhibiting enduring national strength, whilst also for Australia in its desire to demonstrate Australia’s commitment to freedom of expression and inclusivity.

The legal proceedings on MH17 will entail many more years of complex legal prosecution. Nevertheless, there appear to be progressive steps towards accountability both of individuals and of Russia as a state.

Rarely has a peacetime British prime minister been confronted with such grave challenges, nor have they appeared so unequal to the task. As UK politics undergoes great change, Australia’s request could be triaged to the bottom of Mr Johnson’s brimming in-tray.

Canberra has been on the receiving end of criticism for not being more vocal when it comes to human rights in China. Yet it is not at all clear that more assertive approaches would be effective, and the steps it takes may continue to disappoint those on both sides of the spectrum.

China appears to have switched from a foot-dragging strategy to public enthusiasm for a finalised agreement on an ASEAN-China Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. Such a document may reduce the scope for American involvement, but doesn’t necessarily mean that China desires a wholesale overhaul of the rules-based order.