Russia’s decision to withdraw from Syria came as a surprise to many, but only due to a misdiagnosis of Russia’s reasons for intervening in the first place. The myths of intervention need to be dispelled in order to not only better understand the decision to withdraw, but to comprehend this assertive shift in Russia’s foreign policy.

In trying to rationalise Russia’s actions in Syria, observers relied on an outdated conception of Russia’s foreign policy as concerned only with ‘vital interests’ and immediate security threats. While this traditional logic explained the interventions in Georgia and Ukraine – as Russian attempts to prevent NATO gains on its borders – it failed to explain why Russia would seemingly withdraw from Syria so prematurely. This is because Syria can’t be explained through the logic of Russia’s vital interests.

Syria may be host to Russia’s only foreign military installation, but the symbolic significance of the under-resourced base far outweighs its strategic utility. The abandonment of the Tartus facility had been foreshadowed for years and was formalised over six months before Russia’s intervention. It was finally clinched when the governments of Russia and Cyprus made a deal to allow Russia access to Cypriot ports and airstrips in exchange for a debt write off.

While Russia’s arms trade with Syria was lucrative, their even more lucrative arms trade with Gaddafi was not enough for Russia to mount any serious opposition to the intervention in Libya when it was more financially capable of doing so. The generally veto-happy nation opted to abstain from voting on the UNSC resolution which permitted the intrusion.

While Chechen radicals operate in Syria’s north, Chechen separatism is no longer the threat it once was to Russia. Even if it were, international terrorism hasn’t been cause for Russian intervention in the past. While it permitted use of its airspace in the early stages of the Afghanistan war, Russia never provided military support despite the Taliban and al-Qaeda representing a real domestic security threat due to their financial and military support of Chechen extremists during the then ongoing second Chechen war.

Finally, Russia’s activity in Syria has been seen as an intentional distraction from Ukraine. This might have been the case had Russia’s message been well received in the region. But Russia hasn’t won any hearts or minds by backing Assad, and the states that do support its policies already enjoy relatively good relations with Russia. Admittedly, Syria has distracted the world from Ukraine – but at an economic, military and reputational cost that far outweighs the benefits.

What Russia’s actions really represent is a paradigm shift in the conception of foreign policy and national interests. It represents a willingness to return to a proactive role in the shaping of global politics; to protect Russia’s interest through the projection of Russia’s global vision in which sovereignty, stability and balance of power matters more than regime and ideology. Had Russia been pursuing only its ‘vital interests’ it should have expedited the removal of Assad to win the support of the new Syrian government to safeguard its military presence, arms trade and reputation in the region. But this wasn’t Russia’s goal.

Put plainly, a nation doesn’t enter a costly international war in which it directly contests U.S. policy to save an old military base, modest economic ties, or draw attention away from another war. It enters a costly international war in which it directly contests U.S. policy when it wants to directly contest U.S. policy.

And Russia’s actions in Syria reflect that. It signalled to the region’s leaders that unlike the U.S., Russia’s allegiances won’t shift at the hint of revolution. It challenged the Coalition’s credibility by achieving more to disrupt IS in 5 months than the U.S. had in over a year. It initiated the most successful cease-fire agreement to date and with it an environment conducive to a political solution. And in withdrawing so early, it demonstrated restraint; a skill sorely lacked by the West.

Russia successfully achieved its short term goals in Syria – these just weren’t the goals the world had in mind. After successfully challenging the credibility of the U.S. and its regional allies, Russia had done all it needed to do.

Alexander Galitsky is commencing his third year of a Bachelor of Political, Economic and Social Sciences majoring in Governmental and International Relations at the University of Sydney. He has previously worked as a paralegal at Norton and White. His research interests are in Russian/Eurasian geopolitics and global power transition.