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Food, Markets and Human Rights: the role of speculation in food crises

Published 23 Nov 2014

By Alexandra Horwood

International human rights law requires states to ensure that human rights, including the right to food, are realised for their citizens — through committing resources, enacting legislation and preventing discrimination. Governments in developing nations have made substantive commitments and progress towards human rights, particularly socioeconomic rights. However, in the last few years of global recession, human rights have been deprioritised as governments struggle to stabilise the economic turmoil. The global trade institutions have been advancing austerity measures, trade liberalisation and the opening of markets in order to balance budgets.

The food crisis of 2008 was intimately linked with the Global Financial Crisis. It is now becoming apparent that speculation by financial institutions and banks in agricultural commodity markets was a major cause of the food price volatility that caused the food crisis, and is still undermining food security and access to food for people around the world. This issue came onto the global agenda through a report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food.[1] Although other emerging factors (such as biofuels, climate change, and changing food preferences) play a role in the steady increase of food prices, these factors, in addition to traditional macroeconomic factors such as currency exchange rates and fluctuating input prices, do not explain the pattern of volatility exhibited by agricultural commodity prices since 2007.

As consensus grows regarding the influence of financial speculation in agricultural commodities in causing the food crisis, many actors — including banks and finance institutions, governments and international NGOs — are recognising the negative impact of the financialisation of the commodity market, and moving to restrict this activity. This is being done by making trading more transparent and accountable, and limiting the access of banks and finance institutions to commodity markets.

Although it is not yet proven conclusively that speculation is the major cause of recent volatility in food prices, it seems likely and it would therefore be sensible for governments and international NGOs to move to restrict this. The regulation of financial speculation in commodity markets may have far more potential to positively impact the realisation of socioeconomic rights for the world than food programs delivered by governments.

The Right to Food

Over a billion people live without adequate access to food, despite enough food being produced to feed humanity twice over. Malnutrition causes more than half of the global deaths of children under five; chronic malnutrition in childhood causes severe lifelong harm including chronic illness and mental and physical impairment.

The right to food is codified in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  160 countries are party to ICESCR (with none entering a reservation to the right to food), and a further seven have ratified but not yet signed. This right provides an entitlement for individuals to have access to adequate food, and places legal obligations on state parties to overcome hunger and malnutrition, and attain food security for their populations. Parties are required to take measures towards realising an equitable distribution of world food supplies according to need, including the obligation to ensure that trade policies adhere to this policy. States are also obligated to ensure that they respect, support and fulfil the right to food of people living in other countries, entailing a responsibility to ensure that their own citizens and corporations do not violate people’s right to food in other territories.

The right to food is not a right to be fed by the government; rather, a right to be able to feed oneself. This means that states are obligated to provide the conditions in which people are able to produce food or to buy food, ensuring that food is available, accessible, affordable and adequate for dietary needs, with specific attention to those in vulnerable situations.

In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, many countries are finding it difficult to maintain existing welfare programs, let alone implement more; human rights are reverting to being treated as a luxury rather than a necessity. Austerity measures are being imposed to balance government budgets at the expense of the human rights of citizens.

Economic Markets in Food

In recognition of scarcer government resources, a method which could offer significant benefits towards the realisation of food security for least developed countries (LDCs) is to analyse the markets that determine the price of food. Over the past few decades, the IMF, World Bank and WTO have been imposing a program of market liberalisation and structural adjustment programs (known as the Washington Consensus) on LDCs as a condition of loans, development assistance or trade agreements. Both the Washington Consensus, and grassroots resistance to its implementation, are criticised for being ideologically driven, rather than based on evidence tailored to the local economy. The impact of the Washington Consensus on global food security and access to food is thus highly contested.

These programs have generally resulted in major reforms to agriculture, with export commodities replacing food for domestic consumption, and the removal of protective measures like import trade barriers and farmer subsidies. Agricultural markets are being opened up and connected into the globalised market. The main agricultural commodities traded on the global market are wheat, maize (corn), sugar, cotton, soybean, coffee and cocoa.[2] Rice is one of the most traded commodities, but typically as a direct and domestic transaction rather than through global markets.[3]

Price transmission, which measures how closely the domestic price of a good changes in correlation with the international price of that good, varies between countries and commodity types. Factors that affect price transmission include trade restrictions, transport costs, domestic supply and exchange rates. As a result of the structural adjustment programs, two-thirds of LDCs are now net importers of food.[4] As countries become more dependent on imported food, the price transmission of agricultural commodities increases. This means that changes in the global prices of commodities can have a major impact on domestic prices of food, and hence affect food security for people living in LDCs, where up to 80 per cent of household income is spent on food.[5] Rapidly increasing food prices also stimulates inflation, and up to half the nominal rate of inflation in LDCs is attributed to imported food prices, undermining government attempts at macroeconomic stability.[6]

The Food Crisis

In 2008, skyrocketing prices in agricultural commodities led to major food shortages around the world. Restricted access to food led to riots in over thirty countries, with lethal results.[7] It is estimated that more than 250 million extra people went without adequate food during this period.[8]

The increase in price did not generally result in significant profits to farmers in LDCs.[9] The primary producers are too disconnected from international markets to benefit from high prices, as many are now sharecroppers or sell their crops directly to agribusiness. Farmers were actually faced with higher input costs (such as oil, the price of which correlated with agricultural commodities) during this time.[10]

The price of agricultural commodities plummeted afterwards; however, the lower prices did not transmit to a reprieve in the cost of food for many people in LDCs.[11] Global prices then rose again sharply in 2010–11. Since the all-time high set in August 2012, international food prices have been gradually decreasing.[12] This rollercoaster price of agricultural commodities over the past five years is having a significant impact on people’s access to food, and hence their access to human rights.[13]

Agricultural commodity prices are historically prone to volatility and bubbles, due to both supply and demand side factors (such as weather, currency fluctuations, substitutability, labour and technology productivity). The nominal price of commodities has been gradually increasing; however, the real price of agricultural commodities had been gradually decreasing until 2006.[14] Commodity prices have been subject to structural changes in underlying supply and demand conditions, particularly due to the increasing interconnectedness of markets, globalisation and financialisation. Globalised food chains accumulate new intermediaries between producer and consumer, each requiring a fee for their service.

Causes of the Food Crisis

Several factors contributed to the 2008 bubble in agricultural commodity prices, but the influence of each was not able to be quantified until the subsequent rollercoaster of prices became apparent.[15]

Climate change is identified by many commentators as a factor in price volatility. Agriculture (particularly livestock) is one of the most significant contributors to climate change, but also one of the most susceptible to its impacts.[16] Increasing climate volatility and extreme weather events such as drought and floods affect yields of harvests and livestock, and lead to soil degradation. However, analyses differ as to the impact of individual country yields on global stocks, and there has not been any actual global shortage of food yet. As Amartya Sen demonstrated, famines are not due to a lack of food, but result from unequal distribution of and access to food.[17]

Biofuels — plants converted into ethanol as fuel for cars — are another factor affecting agricultural commodity prices, as the source plants are typically diverted from food supplies, rather than extra crops being planted. Although ethanol has been added to petrol since the 1970s, the political backlash against oil-dependency in the early 2000s has intensified the production of ethanol.[18] Food intended for people is now competing with food intended for cars, with regards to the crops, the agricultural land, the inputs (such as fertiliser) and the labour. This competition reduces the available supply of food, and biofuels have been demonstrated to be responsible for a steady increase in nominal food prices.[19]

On the demand side, changes in food preferences also impact agricultural commodity prices. As significant numbers of people are lifted out of poverty, particularly in India and China, their diet changes as they are able to afford more meat, and therefore eat less grains and cereal.[20] Meat and dairy products are typically more expensive than grains and cereal (due to the animals needing to eat grains and cereal before providing any food themselves). However, both India and China are currently self-sufficient in their demand for food, and remain net food exporters.[21]

These three factors — climate change, biofuels, and changed preferences — contribute some explanatory power for the initial bubble in food prices in 2008. However, they do not explain the rollercoaster in agricultural commodity prices that followed.[22] Financial speculation in commodities has now emerged as the most significant cause of the extreme price volatility.

Speculation in Agricultural Commodities

Over the past few decades, there has been an increasing trend towards ‘financialisation’, whereby international financial institutions have become involved in previously isolated markets, with significant impacts.[23] The agricultural commodity market has become part of this trend.

Speculation in agricultural commodity markets has been around since before 1750BC.[24] In the simplest economic model, farmers transfer an existing crop to a purchaser at the current market price, known as ‘spot price’. This model comprises uncertainty and risk for both the farmer and the purchaser, as the price may be well above or below what each party needs to break even on their other costs. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a purchaser or seller will be available and willing to contract at the required time.

A model evolved where farmers would negotiate ‘futures’ contracts with a purchaser agreeing to deliver a set quantity of the crop at an agreed price (the ‘forward price’) on a set date in the future, which provides more certainty for both the farmer and the purchaser. The timeframe for these futures contracts is typically up to three months.[25] In theory, the price for a futures contract should converge to the spot price for that commodity as the delivery date approaches.

The risks can then be further transferred to an intermediary, in return for a commission or expected profit (which becomes built into food prices) from a change in prices. This process is known as hedging. Hedging increases liquidity (access to cashflow) for farmers, which enables them to purchase the necessary inputs (such as seeds, fertiliser or feed) to be able to produce the commodity. Investors who buy futures contracts without having an underlying physical position to hedge are called speculators.

Commodity exchanges arose where these intermediaries could on-sell the futures contracts. They were thought to improve risk management, price discovery and lower transaction costs. Until recently, people who traded on these exchanges were specialists in the commodity, and there were strict regulations such as position limits (restricting the amount of a commodity that could be held by any party, in order to prevent cornering the market) and daily clearance of debts. This system of regulated speculation in futures contracts is regarded as a general stabiliser for agricultural prices and markets, by managing risk.

The dominant commodity exchanges are in the USA, which largely set the global prices.[26] In 2000, the US Congress relaxed the rules regulating commodity trading and the behaviour of commodity exchanges, as a result of pressure from banks and finance institutions which were looking for alternative investment markets after the dotcom crash.[27] This allowed trading to take place outside the regulated exchanges, and allowed traders to swap contracts with banks and other institutions.

In 1991 Goldman Sachs had devised a new type of investment, a commodities index product known as collateralised commodities obligations (CCOs), which has been copied by other banks and finance institutions and has become much more prominent since the turn of the millennium.[28] These CCOs are derivatives of futures contracts, but just before the product is due to be delivered, the contracts are swapped for a new contract with a future delivery date, ad infinitum.

Since the 2000 USA regulatory changes, the majority of these transactions are now taking place outside the formal commodities markets — ‘OTC’ (over the counter) trading — with no transparency or accountability.[29] As OTC transactions do not require upfront collateral or for trades to be cleared, huge debts can accumulate with proportionate risks. Inability to pay for a large number of unsecured commodity contracts was one of the causes of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.[30] Investment guru Warren Buffet labelled these futures swaps “financial weapons of mass destruction”.[31]

This new model of investment has introduced long positions to a traditionally ‘short’-only market[32] in the form of the CCOs which are long-term passive investments; short-term speculation has also increased with the trade in commodity derivatives.[33] Additionally, the new model has introduced investors who have no interest in the production or consumption of agriculture, and are only interested in the ability to make a profit from the trading of contracts. The debate is now over how destabilising, rather than stabilising, this new form of speculation is to agricultural commodity prices. The massive influx of capital has increased not only the liquidity but also the volatility of the market.[34]

The behaviour of spot and forward prices formed a speculative loop.[35] The price increase caused by CCO investment in long-term positions led buyers on the spot markets to buy extra, hedging against future price increases. This in turn increased demand and price. Sellers on the spot market would simultaneously delay sales in anticipation of higher prices, which caused shortages (regardless of actual yields) that further increased prices.[36] For example, during the 2008 food crisis the price of wheat more than doubled, yet the wheat harvest was the largest ever.[37]

The normal behaviour of commodities is that the futures price for a good should be lower than the spot price, known as ‘backwardation’. In the lead up to the food crisis, futures prices were actually higher than spot prices (known as ‘contango’) — fundamentally detached from the value of the underlying commodity.[38] When spot prices and future prices do not correlate, producers and buyers of agricultural commodities face uncertainty and are unable to hedge effectively, which means that they are likely to abandon their trade due to the risks. The continuation of confusing, ambiguous or wrong price signals is likely to lead to farmers abandoning agricultural production, impacting the future supply of food.

Speculation as a Cause of the Food Crisis

As the crisis in the US housing market started unfolding in 2006 — the tipping point of the Global Financial Crisis — banks and financial institutions fled the mortgage market.[39] Derivatives trading is a zero-sum betting game — for every winner, there is a corresponding loser. The US government bail-outs of finance institutions and banks during the Global Financial Crisis transferred these losing bets from the private sector to the taxpayer.[40] As commodities markets were traditionally (before the invention of commodities indices) believed to behave independently of other markets, these institutions started investing huge sums of money into agricultural and other commodities.[41] In 2011, more than a quarter of global capital investment was poured into agricultural commodities.[42]

The influence that the massive influx of capital had on food prices is now being fiercely debated.[43] As the majority of transactions are now OTC, the data is no longer public. Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish causation from correlation in such a complex and global issue.[44] Conventional economists hold that the 2008 surge in food prices can be explained by supply and demand factors such as climate change and biofuels.[45] Some commentators also deny that food prices constituted a bubble.[46] However, these analyses are unable to explain the rollercoaster prices since 2008.[47] Food prices almost doubled during 2008, and then fell back to 2007 levels.[48]

Various analysts have made the case through economic modelling that excessive speculation is the cause of the recent volatility in food prices.[49] The theory of ‘herd behaviour’ among financial investors,[50] particularly seen in concert with investor response to the Global Financial Crisis, is plausible to explain the price volatility since 2008.[51] The intrinsic volatility of agricultural commodities supply, in conjunction with excessive speculation on commodities, has led to a “vicious cycle of destabilising cash prices”.[52]

One argument against speculation and financialisation being the cause of the price hikes in agricultural commodities is that non-traded agricultural commodities such as apples have experienced the same price patterns as those commodities that are included in commodity indices.[53] However, it seems logical that if some food products are increasing in price, demand would flow to substitute food products (such as apples), causing the price of those to increase. Therefore, this argument does not seem to negate the impact of financialisation on agricultural commodity prices.

Although not universally accepted, it does seem likely that financialisation and excessive speculation by finance institutions in commodity markets has increased both volatility and overall prices, with the global poor bearing the harm. The argument that speculation and financialisation is a significant contributor to price volatility and price rises in agricultural commodities has been either accepted or acknowledged as plausible by a number of significant global actors, including FAO[54], UNCTAD[55], the G20[56], the EU,[57] the World Bank and the IMF[58].

A 2011 report co-authored by the major trade organisations noted that:

“variations in prices become problematic when they are large and cannot be anticipated and, as a result, create a level of uncertainty which increases risks for producers, traders, consumers and governments. Variations in prices that do not reflect market fundamentals are also problematic as they can lead to incorrect decisions. Behind concerns about volatility lie concerns about price levels and behind both, lie concerns about food security… While analysts argue about whether financial speculation has been a major factor, most agree that increased participation by non-commercial actors such as index funds, swap dealers and money managers in financial markets probably acted to amplify short term price swings and could have contributed to the formation of price bubbles in some situations.”[59]

After an Oxfam awareness campaign in Germany and France that speculation in agricultural markets is likely to be undermining food security and therefore violating the right to food, many European banks agreed to stop or limit speculation in agricultural markets.[60] A significant motivating factor for this has been the influence of the United Nations Global Compact, which includes a pledge that businesses should protect and promote human rights. Multinational corporations are increasingly attuned to human rights as a part of corporate social responsibility.

Responses to the Food Crisis and Commodity Speculation

The response by governments to both the food crisis and the Global Financial Crisis has been varied. Several governments have taken action in response to the evidence that excessive financial speculation was a contributor to the food crisis, notably France and the USA.

Suggestions to prevent financial speculation in agricultural commodities, and to ensure greater stability in food prices to maximise food security and access to adequate food, include the reintroduction of position limits, mandating daily clearance of debts, a ban on OTC trading, the democratisation of global finance institutions and the introduction of a transaction tax on futures trading.

As many countries are struggling to balance their budgets and recover from recession, these methods would offer the opportunity to stabilise food prices and increase food security for their populations without significant resource outlay. Previous generations have introduced restrictions and regulations on trading in agricultural commodities due to similar fears.[61] Any policy changes would need to happen through multilateral cooperation, to prevent flight of the commodity financial industry to less regulated countries.

Total elimination of speculation in agriculture would be undesirable, as it would leave farmers and producers exposed to significant risk. However, it has become apparent that leaving the market open to financial investors is destabilising and leads to price bubbles and excessive volatility, undermining access to food by people in LDCs. As poor people have to spend higher proportions of their income on food, this restricts their income available to spend on realising other human rights such as education and healthcare.

Conclusion

As demonstrated by the 2008 food crisis and the Global Financial Crisis, price fluctuations for agricultural commodities have the potential to drastically affect human rights, particularly the right to food, for citizens in LDCs. This can undermine the well-intentioned policies and programs implemented by governments to secure or implement access to socioeconomic rights for their population.

Governments are obligated under international human rights law to provide food security for their population, and to ensure that their citizens and corporations do not undermine access to food for others. The evidence seems persuasive that financial speculation in agricultural commodity markets was a significant cause of the 2008 food crisis and subsequent price volatility. States and international NGOs should therefore focus on the regulation of agricultural markets to stabilise food prices and ensure food security.

The financialisation of food markets beyond the hedging function does not serve any social good, and indeed it has been demonstrated that the losses incurred in this market have been transferred to taxpayers when banks and financial institutions have been bailed out by governments. The only interests served by financial speculation in commodity markets are those of investors.

A number of finance institutions and banks have voluntarily agreed to stop speculating in agricultural commodity markets, in recognition that such behaviour is incompatible with human rights and corporate social responsibility. Strong leadership will be required to implement the changes needed to regulate the agricultural commodities market so that it operates for the benefit of farmers, purchasers and consumers.

Although it would represent a lost market for banks and finance institutions, the human cost of the 2008 food crisis demonstrated that agriculture is too vital for the realisation of human rights to allow excessive financial speculation in food. It is thus in the interests of state parties to regulate commodity markets, as this is a non-resource-intensive way to help realise the right to food for their populations.

 

Alexandra Horwood is former Editor-in-Chief of Quarterly Access and currently works for the Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet.

 

[1] De Schutter, Olivier (23 September 2010) Food Commodities, Speculation and Food Price Crises, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food <http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20102309_briefing_note_02_en_ok.pdf>

[2] Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) (April 2010) Financing Food <http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_3471/at_download/fullfile>, 2.

[3] Windawi, Jason (February 2012) Speculation, Embedding and Food Prices: A cointegration analysis, Columbia University <http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content/download/ac:146502/CONTENT/iserp_working_paper_2012-02.pdf>.

[4] Staritz, Cornelia (April 2012) Financial Markets and the Commodity Price Boom: Causes and implications for developing countries, Austrian Research Foundation for International Development <http://www.oefse.at/Downloads/publikationen/WP30_financial_markets.pdf> 21.

[5] Paramaguru, Kharunya (17 December 2012) ‘Betting on Hunger: Is Financial Speculation to Blame for High Food Prices?’ Time (Online) <http://science.time.com/2012/12/17/betting-on-hunger-is-financial-speculation-to-blame-for-high-food-prices/>.

[6] Wahl, Peter (2009) Food Speculation the Main Factor of the Price Bubble in 2008 World Economy, Ecology and Development <http://www2.weed-online.org/uploads/weed_food_speculation.pdf> 5.

[7] Amann, Susanne and Alexander Jung (29 July 2010) Choc Finger’s Big Bet: Speculators Rediscover Agricultural Commodities, Der Spiegel. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/choc-finger-s-big-bet-speculators-rediscover-agricultural-commodities-a-708765.html>.

[8] Kaufman, Frederick “The Food Bubble: How Wall Street starved millions and got away with it”, Harper’s Magazine: New York. (July 2010) 27-34, 28.

[9] High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (July 2011) Price Volatility and Food Security, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations <http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe>.

[10] Girardi, Daniele (15 November 2011) Do Financial Investors Affect Commodity Prices? The case of hard red winter wheat Munich Personal Repec Archive <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35670/1/MPRA_paper_35670.pdf> 6.

[11] Ghosh, Jayati (October 2010) Commodity Speculation and the Food Crisis, World Development Movement <http://www.wdm.org.uk/sites/default/files/Commodity%20speculation%20and%20food%20crisis.pdf> 7.

[12] World Bank (March 2013) Food Price Watch <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/201price-watch>, 1.

[13] Oxfam International (October 2008) Double-Edged Prices: Lessons from the Food Price Crises <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp121-double-edged-prices-lessons-from-food-price-crisis-0810.pdf>.

[14] Task Force on the Role of Speculation in Agricultural Commodities Price Movements (21 November 2008) Is There a Speculative Bubble in Commodity Markets? Commission of the European Communities <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication13765_en.pdf>, 7.

[15] Troester, Bernhard (July 2012) The Determinants of the Recent Food Price Surges: A basic supply and demand model, Berlin University of Applied Sciences <http://daadpartnership.htwberlin.de/fileadmin/working_paper_series/wp_06_2012_Troester_Food-prices.pdf>

[16] High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (2011) 13.

[17] Sen, Amartya (1981) Poverty and Famines: An essay on entitlement and deprivation. Oxford University Press.

[18] Troester (2012) 27.

[19] Lagi, Marco, Yavni Bar-Yam, Karla Bertrand and Yaneer Bar-Yam (21 September 2011) The Food Crises: A Quantitative Model of Food Prices Including Speculators and Ethanol Conversion, New England Complex Systems Institute <http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_prices.pdf>

[20] Troester (2012) 35.

[21] Lagi et al (2011) 8.

[22] Windawi (2012)

[23] Dowell-Jones, Mary and David Kinley (2011) “Minding the Gap: Global finance and human rights” in Ethics and International Affairs 25(2) 183, 185.

[24] Ciro, Tony (2002) ‘Anti-Speculation Laws and Financial Markets Regulation in Australia and the United States’ 13 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 15.

[25] Staritz (2012) 13.

[26] Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) (2010b).

[27] Ghosh, Jayati (August 2009) The Unnatural Coupling: Food and Global Finance <http://www.networkideas.org/working/dec2009/08_2009.pdf>.

[28] Kaufman (2010).

[29] Francis, Smitha and Murali Kallummal (2009) Financial Liberalisation and Agriculture: An overview of the challenges before developing countries. National Autonomous University of Mexico <http://www.posgrado.economia.unam.mx/seminario-ef/smitha-francis_murali-kallummal.pdf> 12.

[30] Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) (2010b) 4.

[31] Quoted in Dowell-Jones and Kinley (2011), 194.

[32] Windawi (2012).

[33] Windawi (2012) 9.

[34] Ghosh, Jayati, James Heintz and Robert Pollin (October 2011) Speculation on Commodities Futures Markets and Destabilization of Global Food Prices: Exploring the Connections  University of Massachusetts <http://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_apers_251-300/WP269.pdf>

[35] Task Force on the Role of Speculation in Agricultural Commodities Price Movements (2008) 5.

[36] Wahl (2009) 12-13.

[37] Kaufman (2010) 34.

[38] Ghosh (2010) 6.

[39] Girardi (2011) 15.

[40] Basu, Parantap & William Gavin (February 2012) “What Explains the Growth in Commodity Derivatives?” in Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Excessive Speculation in Agricultural Commodities  <http://www.iatp.org/files/2012_ExcessiveSpeculationReader_web.pdf> 12.

[41] Dowell-Jones and Kinsley (2011) 195.

[42] Oxfam Deutschland (May 2012) Don’t Gamble with Food! How the German financial industry is making a business out of hunger  <http://www.oxfam.de/sites/www.oxfam.de/files/englische_zusammenfassung_final.pdf> 1.

[43] Task Force on the Role of Speculation in Agricultural Commodities Price Movements (2008).

[44] Staritz (2012) 19.

[45] Piesse, Jenifer & Colin Thirtle (2009) “Three Bubbles and a Panic: An explanatory review of recent food commodity price events” Food Policy 34. 119.

[46] Irwin, Scott, Dwight Sanders & Robert Merrin (2009) “Devil or Angel? The Role of Speculation in the Recent Commodity Price Boom and Bust.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 41(2). 377.

[47] Henn, Markus (23 July 2013) Evidence on the Negative Impact of Commodity Speculation by Academics, Analysts and Public Institutions  World Economy Ecology and Development <http://www2.weedonline.org/uploads/evidence_on_impact_of_commodity_speculation.pdf>

[48] Wahl (2009) 14.

[49] Largi et al. (2011); Marco Largi, Yavni Bar-Yam, Karla Bertrand & Yaneer Bar-Yam (27 March 2012) Update: The Food Crisis: Predictive Validation of a Quantitative Model of Food Prices Including Speculators and Ethanol Conversion  New England Complex Systems Institute <http://necsi.edu/research/social/foodprices/update/food_prices_update.pdf>; Girardi (2011); Ke Tang & Wei Xiong (2012) “Index Investment and the Financialization of Commodities” Financial Analysts Journal 68(6). 54.

[50] Staritz (2012) 18.

[51] Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) (2010b).

[52] Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) (2010b) 8.

[53] Troester (2012) 44.

[54] Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2010).

[55] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (United Nations, 2009) Trade and Development Report 2009. 67.

[56] Staritz (2012) 23.

[57] Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) (September 2010) Business as Usual <http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_3611/at_download/fullfile> 5.

[58] Wahl (2009) 9.

[59] Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2 June 2011) Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses <http://www.oecd.org/trade/agricultural-trade/48152638.pdf> 6 & 12.

[60] Ellen Kelleher (3 March 2013) Food Price Taken off the Menu  Financial Times (Online) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4813446-7f5e-11e2-97f6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dWRcINaM>

[61] Irwin, Sanders & Merrin (2009).