Indonesia will be severely impacted by climate change should carbon emissions continue at present-day levels. In recent years, policies within Indonesia have been developed to address the climate problem. However, these efforts have lacked strong implementation and enforcement. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Yudhoyono) introduced policies designed to reduce Indonesia’s emissions however current President Joko Widodo (Widodo) has reversed a number of Yudhoyono’s decisions since he came to power. This essay argues that Indonesia’s most recent presidents have failed to adequately address climate change domestically, despite some positive developments.

 Climate Change in the Indonesian Context

The physical scientific basis around the impact of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is clear and well established. Stern predicts crop failure, water scarcity, destruction of coral reef systems and increases in the intensity of extreme weather events such as drought, floods and forest fires.[1] These changes will have serious implications for Indonesia, given its myriad low-lying islands, coastal populations and large agricultural industry.[2]

In 2014, Indonesia ranked 6^th globally in terms of total GHG emissions.[3] It received a “poor” rating and ranked 34^th in the world in the 2014 Climate Change Performance Index, which rates countries on their climate policy and emissions reductions.[4] Over half of Indonesia’s emissions come from land use change and forestry (LUCF) sources, such as deforestation and peatland burning.[5]

 Climate policy in the Yudhoyono era

 Yudhoyono came to power in October 2004 as the first directly elected president in post-reforms Indonesia. He led Indonesia for two terms before leaving office in October 2014. In the climate space, some have lauded his achievements and others deride him,[6] but many see both positives and negatives in Yudhoyono’s large-scale goals but lack of concrete outcomes.[7]

Yudhoyono’s lasting legacy in combatting climate change in Indonesia is his declaration of Indonesia’s significant emissions reduction targets at the G20 summit in 2009.[8] He fixed the emissions reduction target at 26 per cent of business-as-usual (BAU) levels by 2020, or 41 per cent subject to international support.[9] These targets remain in place today. Yudhoyono was also, on occasion, vocal and proactive in international climate change negotiations. This is perhaps unsurprising given his reputation as an internationalist and his desire to involve himself in foreign policy. He oversaw the 2007 Bali Climate Change Conference, where Indonesia took the lead and helped to ensure a positive outcome.[10] Beyond these achievements, however, Indonesia has not continued its push to become a leader. Climate change was an intensely contentious issue while Indonesian foreign policy under Yudhoyono was typically non-confrontational. McRae aptly summarises Indonesia’s position: “Indonesia…is vocal about the way it would like the world around it to be, but limited in its ability to bend world affairs to its will”.[11] Indonesia must build the domestic credentials necessary to be considered a respected and capable player before it can lead on climate change internationally. Jotzo suggests that this domestic regulatory and omissions-reduction framework is lacking.[12]

Yudhoyono introduced legislation in an effort to combat climate change. He oversaw the beginnings of Indonesia’s 2005-2025 National Long-Term Development Plan that includes various references to sustainable development, environmental protection and energy policy reform.[13] The second phase of its implementation (2009-2014 National Medium-Term Development Plan) includes the development of renewable energy as a priority.[14] The plan further prioritises the better management of peatlands and reforestation projects as key tools for addressing climate change.[15] It is, however, unclear how such actions should be undertaken in practice.

One of Yudhoyono’s great contributions was the establishment of the National Climate Change Council (NCCC) in 2008 (Perpres 46/2008).[16] The body was responsible for overseeing Indonesia’s climate change policy, and ensuring that the issue was addressed across government and in the community more broadly. In 2009, Yudhoyono also oversaw the introduction of new environmental protection legislation (UU32/2009).[17] This legislation is significant in that it requires national, provincial, regency and city governments to consider environmental impacts and develop environmental management plans (Ch.3, Art.10).[18] The document further recognises the serious impacts of climate change in Indonesia, underlining the need for a national, integrated system for environmental management (Penjelasan, Ch.1, Art.2).[19] Again, the problem lies in implementation. Critics have highlighted the urgency of a stronger legal framework to guarantee the realisation of policy, but there has been little progress.[20]

Energy policy was an area of contention for Yudhoyono. He set positive renewable energy generation targets of at least 23 per cent by 2025, and 31 per cent by 2050 (Ch.2, Art. 9).[21] He committed to maximising the use of renewables and minimising the use of oil. The positive targets outlined here, however, were counteracted by Yudhoyono’s desire to secure coal as the ‘mainstay’ energy source for Indonesia’s future (Ch.3, Art. 2). The coal use target for 2025 is at minimum, 30 per cent (Ch.2, Art. 9). This decision was made in the name of energy security, but it could have serious implications for emissions.[22]

Finally, Yudhoyono made a significant impact on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) implementation. The UN REDD+ program started for Indonesia in October 2009, at the beginning of Yudhoyono’s second term. It is of great importance for Indonesia given that over 50 per cent of its GHG emissions originate from LUCF activities.[23] REDD+ properly commenced after the government of Norway secured an agreement with Indonesia in 2010, offering US$1 billion should Indonesia greatly reduce its primary forest logging activities.[24] Yudhoyono subsequently declared a moratorium on all new logging licenses for primary growth forests.[25] While appearing positive on the surface, the instruction contained various loopholes that damage its efficacy. It lists a number of exceptions for existing concessions, even those only approved ‘in principle’, as well as loopholes for mining, electricity and agricultural developments. Yudhoyono extended the moratorium for another two years in 2013, but the system remains leaky.[26] Yudhoyono also took the further step of establishing a national REDD+ agency in 2013 to oversee the implementation of REDD+ initiatives in Indonesia.[27] This was another positive step and an indication of Yudhoyono’s seriousness in combatting climate change.

Despite Yudhoyono’s actions, rhetoric and overall positive efforts, there are few tangible results. Research has found that the deforestation rate doubled to approximately two million hectares per year during the Yudhoyono presidency.[28] The rate of primary forest loss steadily increased between 2000 and 2012.[29] Primary forest loss in 2012 reached 0.84Mha – greater than that of Brazil.[30]

Forest cover was steadily stripped away during the Yudhoyono years. The total forested area fell from 54 per cent in 2005 to 51.4 per cent in 2012, representing a loss of 47,950km² in just seven years.[31] It is predicted that, on current trends, LUCF will contribute 60 per cent of Indonesia’s GHG emissions by 2020.[32]

Looking at general trends, Climate Change Tracker reports that Indonesia’s GHG emissions rose steadily during Yudhoyono’s tenure.[33] In 2005, Indonesia’s annual CO₂ emissions registered at 340,000kt; this figure had increased to over 450,000kt by 2009.[34] Emissions rose further to 500,000kt in 2013.[35] Indonesia’s efforts under Yudhoyono were rated “medium”, but projections indicate that it will slump to an “inadequate” rating by 2020 should the status quo be maintained.[36]

Yudhoyono had good intentions, made sporadic attempts at international climate leadership, and oversaw the development and implementation of a range of environmental policies and bodies aimed at mitigating climate change. However, there have been few quantifiable results. Yudhoyono was unable to effectively regulate carbon emissions, deforestation and land use across the archipelago, resulting in a lot of rhetoric and institution-building, but few tangible results. This is the legacy that Widodo inherited.

 Widodo as environmental protector or villain?

Halimanjaya expresses the need for Widodo to keep up the “momentum” of the Yudhoyono years in being active on the issue of climate change.[37] One of Widodo’s first major actions in office was promising; he cut fuel subsidies substantially. Jotzo cites this policy as an effective way to reduce emissions without incurring financial damage.[38]

Further initial optimism was generated surrounding forest management reform and a crackdown on illegal logging and burning.[39] However, Coca tempers this positivity with an important reminder: “as Yudhoyono’s example shows, it will take a lot more than rhetoric to change Indonesia’s climate path”.[40] Examination of concrete policy and action is required to gauge potential results.

In January 2015, Widodo announced his 2015-2019 National Medium-Term Development Plan, which includes sections on energy sector reform, climate policy and environmental management.[41] It outlines reductions in transportation GHG emissions as well as communicating plans for broader emissions reductions and climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. This is much in the same vein as Yudhoyono’s policy rhetoric. However, the energy policy outlined here – much like Yudhoyono’s – is concerning from a climate change perspective. Widodo places a strong focus on oil and coal as the two most important energy sources during his presidency. He encourages increased exploration and exploitation of fossil fuel resources within Indonesia, and projects that the use of domestically-harvested coal will increase from 24 per cent in 2014 to 60 per cent in 2019.[42] While the expansion of renewables is discussed, fossil fuels are to remain central to Indonesia’s future energy needs. This decision does not bode well for the achievement of emissions reduction targets by 2020.

LUCF remains the largest contributor to Indonesian GHG emissions. Widodo has taken action to reform the governance of this sector, but again the impacts of these reforms remain unclear. Widodo has merged the Department of Environment and the Department of Forestry into one administrative body. The National Climate Change Council (NCCC) has been dismantled.[43] The REDD+ agency has also been closed.[44] The activities of both are now subsumed under the Climate Change Oversight Directorate-General within the new department.[45] This loss of independence for the REDD+ agency and the NCCC is troubling; without direct reporting to the president – and with the influence of department heads, minsters and the interests of those in forestry – action on climate change could lose out to other interests. This action represents the erasure of two of Yudhoyono’s better achievements.

Widodo has extended the primary forest moratorium, but the policy contains the same loopholes and weaknesses as in the Yudhoyono years.[46] In fact, Widodo has exploited those very loopholes to establish a mega-rice farm project in Papua through the proposed clearing of 4.6 million hectares of forest.[47]

It is too early to tell whether Widodo will make progress on climate change in Indonesia. Initial policy documents and media reports show the same rhetoric as in the Yudhoyono presidency. However, a desire to focus on coal for energy production contradicts this environmental protection narrative. The merger of Environment and Forestry departments, and the loss of the NCCC and REDD+ agency could lead to poorer outcomes in climate and environmental policy if business voices are allowed too much weight. Initial action on forest protection has been tokenistic at best. Internationally, Widodo has made no indication that he will take a leading role for Indonesia at the 2015 Paris Climate Summit. Indonesia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), released in September 2015, maintains the 26 per cent reduction target on BAU emissions by 2020, but sets the 2030 target at only a 29 per cent reduction against BAU, with a conditional target of 41 per cent subject to international support.[48] Climate Action Tracker demoted Indonesia to an ‘inadequate’ rating following the release of its INDC, citing a lack of detail and no clarification of the policy instruments to be used to achieve the proposed targets, especially regarding deforestation.[49] Early signs are not promising, and there is still a long way to go.

 Addressing climate change requires state-wide reform and effective enforcement mechanisms. Indonesia currently lacks the capacity to enforce its environmental laws, and the country will continue to struggle to address this issue as things stand. Widodo’s recent policy decisions do not inspire confidence in his ability to instigate reform and lead Indonesia forward to a lower-carbon economy. Widodo is a populist. Many reforms for environmental protection will upset the status quo and the economic interests of Indonesian citizens. There is the risk of popular – rather than difficult but necessary – decisions winning out. Yudhoyono provided a much needed legal and institutional basis for Indonesia’s climate change policy. Widodo needs to deliver on enforcement and achieve results, but his initial actions do not augur well for Indonesia.

Sebastian McLellan is a recent graduate of the Master of International Relations program at the University of Melbourne. He volunteers as the Events Officer at the Victorian Chapter of the Australia-Indonesia Youth Association and is a former intern of the Australian Institute of International Affairs National Office. Sebastian speaks Indonesian and is an alumni of the Australia-Indonesia Youth Exchange Program. His research interests include Indonesian politics and foreign policy, and Australian foreign policy.

[1] Stern, Nicholas (2007) The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

[2] Oktaviani, Rina, Amaliah, Syarifah, Ringler, Claudia, Rosegrant, Mark & Timothy Sulser (2011) The Impact of Global Climate Change on the Indonesian Economy, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01148, International Food Policy Research Institute, http://cdm15738.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/126762/filename/126973.pdf, accessed 4 June 2015.

[3] Ge, Mengpin, Freidrich, Johannes & Thomas Damassa, “6 graphs explain the world’s top 10 emitters” in World Resources Institute (online), 6 November 2014, http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explain-world%E2%80%99s-top-10-emitters.

[4] Burck, Jan, Marten, Franziska & Christoph Bals (2014) The climate change performance index: Results 2014, German Watch/Climate Action Network Europe, https://germanwatch.org/en/download/8599.pdf, accessed 6 June 2015, p. 9.

[5] Ge, above n 3.

[6] Jakarta Post, “SBY faces class-action lawsuit over ‘climate change effects’” in The Jakarta Post (online), 11 September 2013, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/09/11/sby-faces-class-action-lawsuit-over-climate-change-effects.html.

[7] Mahaningtyas, Avi, Firdaus, Asep & Patrick Anderson (2014) Big Commitments, Slow Results: An Assessment on President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Climate Change Policies 2004-2014, Indonesia Update, Australian National University, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/indonesia/Indo-Update-14-Day-2-9b-Anderson-et-al.pdf, accessed 4 June 2015.

[8] Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2009) Intervention by H.E. DR. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono President of the Republic of Indonesia on Climate Change at the G-20 Leaders Summit 25 September 2009, http://forestclimatecenter.org/files/2009-09-25%20Intervention%20by%20President%20SBY%20on%20Climate%20Change%20at%20the%20G-20%20Leaders%20Summit.pdf, accessed 5 June 2015.

[9] Yudhoyono, above n 8.

[10] Jotzo, Frank (2012) “Can Indonesia lead on climate change?” in Reid, AS (ed), Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, ISEAS: Singapore, p. 97.

[11] McRae, David (2014) More Talk than Walk: Indonesia as a Foreign Policy Actor, Lowy Institute, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/mcrae_more_talk_web_0.pdf, accessed 12 March 2015, p. 3.

[12] Jotzo, above n 10.

[13] BAPPENAS (2015) Lampiran Peraturan Republik Indonesia Nomor 2 Tahun 2015 Tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional 2015-2019, https://www.academia.edu/10348772/Buku_RPJMN_Rencana_Pembangunan_Jangka_Menengah_Nasional_2015-2019, accessed 4 June 2015.

[14] BAPPENAS, above n 13, p. 55.

[15] BAPPENAS, above n 13, p. 56.

[16] Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2008) Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 46 Tahun 2008 Tentang Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim, Presiden Republik, http://www.minerba.esdm.go.id/library/sijh/Perpres-46-2008.pdf, accessed 4 June 2015.

[17] Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2009) Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 32 tahun 2009 tentang Perlindungan dan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup, http://prokum.esdm.go.id/uu/2009/UU%2032%20Tahun%202009%20(PPLH).pdf, accessed 4 June 2015.

[18] Yudhoyono, above n 17.

[19] Yudhoyono, above n 17.

[20] Mahaningtyas, above n 7.

[21] Yudhoyono, above n 17.

[22] Yudhoyono, above n 17.

[23] Ge, above n 3.

[24] Lang, Chris, “Norway and Indonesia sign US$1 billion forest deal” in REDD-Monitor (online), 27 May 2010, http://www.redd-monitor.org/2010/05/27/norway-and-indonesia-sign-us1-billion-forest-deal/.

[25] Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2011) Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 2011 tentang Penundaan Pemberian Izin Baru dan Penyempurnaan Tata Kelola Hutan Alam Primer dan Lahan Gambut, Presiden, http://prokum.esdm.go.id/inpres/2011/inpres%20No%2010%20th%202011.pdf, accessed 5 June 2015.

[26] Lang, Chris, “Indonesia’s President extends forest moratorium for two more years” in REDD-Monitor (online), 15 May 2013, http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/05/15/indonesias-president-extends-forest-moratorium-for-two-more-years/.

[27] Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (2013) Decree Number 62 Year 2013 Regarding Managing Agency for the Reduction of Emission from Deforestation and Degradation of Forest and Peatlands, http://blog.cifor.org/19055/full-text-of-president-susilo-bambang-yudhoyonos-decree-on-indonesia-redd-agency#.VXPWSmSeDGc, accessed 5 June 2015.

[28] Lang, Chris, “Indonesia’s rate of deforestation has doubled under the moratorium” in REDD-Monitor (online), 11 December 2013, http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/12/11/indonesias-rate-of-deforestation-has-doubled-under-the-moratorium/.

[29] Margono, BA, Potapov, PV, Turubanova, S, Stolle, F & MC Hansen (2014) “Primary forest cover loss in Indonesia over 2000-2012” in Nature Climate Change, Vol. 4, p. 730.

[30] Margono, above n 29, p. 731.

[31] World Bank (2015) Data – Indonesia: Climate Change, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.FRST.ZS/countries/ID?display=graph, accessed 4 June 2015.

[32] Climate Action Tracker (2015), Indonesia, http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/indonesia/2015.html, accessed 29 October 2015.

[33] Climate Action Tracker, above n 32.

[34] World Bank, above n 31.

[35] World Bank, above n 31.

[36] Climate Action Tracker, above n 32.

[37] Halimanjaya, A, “Indonesian climate change efforts at stake” in ODI (online), 6 August 2014, http://www.odi.org/comment/8710-indonesian-climate-change-efforts-at-stake.

[38] Jotzo, above n 10.

[39] Carrington, Damian, “Indonesia cracks down on deforestation in symbolic u-turn” in The Guardian (online), 27 November 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/27/indonesia-cracks-down-on-deforestation-symbolic-u-turn.

[40] Coca, Nithin, “Will Indonesia get serious on carbon?” in The Diplomat (online), 8 January 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/will-jokowi-get-serious-on-carbon/.

[41] BAPPENAS, above n 13.

[42] BAPPENAS, above n 13, pp. 164-165.

[43] Saturi, Sapariah, “Director-generals inaugurated as merger of Indonesian Environment, Forestry Ministries continues” in Mongabay (online), 2 June 2015, http://news.mongabay.com/2015/0602-jacobson-environment-forestry-ministry-director-generals-inaugurated.html.

[44] Harfenist, Ethan, “Is Indonesian forestry reform in peril under Jokowi?” in The Diplomat (online), 13 February 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/is-indonesian-forestry-reform-in-peril-under-jokowi/.

[45] Saturi, above n 43.

[46] Jong, Hans Nicholas, “Concerns loom over Jokowi’s climate change resolve” in The Jakarta Post (online), 2 February 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/02/concerns-loom-over-jokowi-s-climate-change-resolve.html.

[47] Lang, Chris, “Indonesia: President Jokowi extends the moratorium and announces a 4.6 million hectare land grab” in REDD-Monitor (online), 20 May 2015, http://www.redd-monitor.org/2015/05/20/indonesia-president-jokowi-extends-the-moratorium-and-announces-a-4-6-million-hectare-land-grab/.

[48] UNFCCC (2015) Intended Nationally Determined Contribution – Republic of Indonesia, http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Indonesia/1/INDC_REPUBLIC%20OF%20INDONESIA.pdf, accessed 29 October 2015.

[49] Climate Action Tracker, above n 32.